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ARTICLE 
LOCAL OFFENSES 
Brenner M. Fissell* 
 
Criminal law is generally thought to exist within two jurisdictional levels:  
federal and state.  Neglected in the legal mind, and in legal scholarship, is 
the vast body of criminal law promulgated by local governments.  While one 
should ask “what” is being criminalized by cities, towns, and villages, one 
should also ask “how” these offenses are written.  The offense-drafting 
practices reflected in state criminal law have been extensively studied, but 
this has never been attempted for local offenses.  This Article undertakes that 
task.  After surveying a large number of local criminal codes, this Article 
concludes that local offenses routinely fail to live up to modern drafting 
standards—especially in that they usually lack a mens rea element (and thus 
impose strict liability).  While this is problematic in its own right, special 
concern arises when there is an asymmetry between archaically written local 
offenses and a state criminal code that has been updated to reflect modern 
practice.  In such a context, the home rule powers of the local government 
have the effect of thwarting the advances in criminal law made at the state 
level.  This may be because of a reduced institutional competence of city 
councils and town boards, but it may also be a deliberate choice.  While the 
primary aim of this Article is to unearth this phenomenon and describe its 
implications, these implications can be seen as relevant for two significant 
conversations in criminal law scholarship:  the recent literature studying the 
misdemeanor system and also the movement to “democratize” criminal 
justice.  In general, recognition of harmful local-state offense asymmetry 
should temper the prolocalist optimism of both groups. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When most Americans think about the lawmaking powers of city councils 
or town boards, they probably think of “codes enforcement”—the colloquial 
term for the trivial rules that dictate how we must tend to our houses, lawns, 
and yards.  At most, violation of these rules is usually thought to trigger a 
ticket or a small monetary fine.  In reality, though, local governments—even 
the smallest village—possess vast powers to criminalize conduct and to 
punish violators with months in prison or probation.  The U.S. Department 
of Justice’s investigation of the Ferguson Police Department in 2015 helped 
to shine a light on this “shadow criminal law”1 and reported the following 
observation:  “Ferguson’s municipal code addresses nearly every aspect of 
civic life for those who live in Ferguson . . . .”2 
Moreover, recent scholarship regarding the misdemeanor criminal justice 
system (both state and local) has emphasized the significant impact that the 
 
 1. This label is from Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal 
Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1409 (2001). 
 2. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. C.R. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 
7 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/ 
03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/TP4R-4S5G]. 
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enforcement of low-level offenses has on the lives of many citizens.  
Alexandra Natapoff writes that, while misdemeanors have long been seen as 
the “chump change” of the criminal justice system, unworthy of the attention 
of scholars, activists, and reformers, the misdemeanor system is nevertheless 
“enormous, powerful, and surprisingly harsh.”3  These offenses constitute 80 
percent of the criminal cases in the United States.4 
While the effects of the misdemeanor system (both state and local) have 
recently received interest, scholars have yet to focus sustained attention on 
the substantive criminal law created by local governments—the offenses that 
“address[] nearly every aspect of civic life” in localities.5  Only one in-depth 
treatment exists:  a 2001 study by Wayne Logan.6  A significant achievement 
of Logan’s article is to analyze the “dilemma of localism”7—the 
simultaneous opportunity and threat presented by devolution of power to 
smaller jurisdictions—in the specific context of criminal law.  In particular, 
there is a well-recognized threat of parochialism in criminalization decisions:  
majorities become more powerful when they are more concentrated within 
smaller jurisdictional boundaries, and they can use this power to punish the 
conduct of disfavored minorities.8  Logan discusses various hypotheses that 
 
 3. ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME 2 (2018) (“Because the crimes 
are small and the punishments relatively light in comparison to felonies, this world of low-
level offenses has not gotten much attention.”). 
 4. Id. 
 5. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. C.R. DIV., supra note 2, at 7. 
 6. See generally Logan, supra note 1.  Logan’s work came at a time of intense debate in 
local government law scholarship.  The home rule movement’s trend in favor of increased 
local power had been defended by scholars such as Gerald Frug in the early 1980s, Gerald E. 
Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1108–13 (1980), who “emphasized 
the progressive possibilities that local power, especially urban power, presented.” David J. 
Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2257, 2331 (2003).  A decade later, 
localism received an influential critique from Richard Briffault, who argued that localism had 
been hijacked by affluent suburbs to serve selfish and exclusionary ends. Richard Briffault, 
Our Localism (pt. 1), 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism:  
Part I]; see also Richard Briffault, Our Localism (pt. 2), 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 349–56 
(1990) (describing this argument for localism).  Summarizing this tension around the same 
time that Logan was writing, Roderick Hills concluded, “lovers of local government . . . are 
going to have to make a tough choice between the direct political participation that local 
governments facilitate and the social inequality and parochialism that local governments also 
seem to promote.” Roderick M. Hills Jr., Romancing the Town:  Why We (Still) Need a 
Democratic Defense of City Power, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2011–12 (2000).  Local power 
allowed for increased democratic involvement and policy experimentation, but this power 
could be directed towards nefarious (“parochial”) goals. Id. 
 7. See generally Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of Localism in an Era of 
Polarization, 128 YALE L.J. 954 (2019). 
 8. “Localities . . . indulge in a marked tendency toward oppressive use of the criminal 
sanction.” Logan, supra note 1, at 1449.  He highlights the example of local criminal laws 
targeting homosexual conduct and also those targeting the religious practices of minorities. 
Id. at 1449–50.  Perhaps the most well-known examples are the local vagrancy offenses that 
were enforced against unpopular groups. Id.; see also RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION:  
POLICE POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND THE MAKING OF THE 1960S, at 2–4 (2016) 
(describing the variety of people who were subjected to local vagrancy laws); BERNARD 
HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER:  THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 185 
(2005) (discussing how vagrancy and disorderly conduct offenses, combined with “order 
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might explain this,9 and he also notes the implications of local offenses for 
criminal procedure.10 
If Logan’s work can be characterized as raising issues related to the content 
of local criminal laws, in this Article, I intend to address those relating to 
their form.  This Article aims not to assess what conduct is made criminal by 
local offenses but the manner in which the offenses are drafted.  Such a study 
has never been undertaken.  With nearly 40,000 local governments,11 one can 
understand why.  The risk of erroneous generalization may have deterred 
many scholars in the past.  Given the significant impact that local offenses 
have on American life, though, it is imperative that more research be done.  
Recognizing the limits that come with the vast sample size, I will avoid 
empirical or statistical claims and instead offer qualitative observations of 
identifiable trends. 
The most important trend is this:  many local jurisdictions draft criminal 
offenses in what we can call an archaic form.  As will be explained, the term 
“archaic” is somewhat of a stand-in for pre–Model Penal Code offense-
drafting methods, in which there was “a tradition of poor drafting” and 
confusing or absent culpability requirements.12  This can be contrasted with 
modern offense drafting, which reflects the values of “analytical clarity” in 
 
maintenance” policing, transformed “the ‘losers’ of society” such as “hoboes, bums, [and] 
winos” into “agents of crime and neighborhood decline”). 
 9. Logan, supra note 1, at 1451 (“[L]ocal legislators’ very proximity to disorder . . . 
might make them prone to react punitively, and to indulge their own idiosyncratic standards 
of decorum.”).  Logan also suggests that the pathologies inherent in criminal lawmaking may 
be exacerbated in local politics:  “[T]he recognized political appeal of appearing tough on 
crime and disorder might suggest an even greater influence in the local political arena,” he 
notes, “the small scale of which might create a particularly conducive environment for 
oppressive decisions.” Id. at 1452.  Finally, Logan posits that the knee-jerk resort to 
criminalization by localities might be explained as pragmatism due to their constrained 
lawmaking powers; given localities’ “comparative paucity in available means of social 
control,” the creation of a criminal offense is an “easily adopted and expedient (if crude) 
method for the control of ‘dangerous classes.’” Id. at 1453 (quoting CHARLES LORING BRACE, 
THE DANGEROUS CLASSES OF NEW YORK AND TWENTY-YEARS’ WORK AMONG THEM 28–29 
(New York, Wynkoop & Hallenbeck 1872)). 
 10. See generally Wayne A. Logan, Fourth Amendment Localism, 93 IND. L.J. 369 (2018).  
Essentially, more criminal law—even local criminal laws covering trivial offenses—justifies 
more police stops and more police searches. Logan, supra note 1, at 1439–40.  This is 
significant not only because of the intrusion on privacy and liberty that results but also because 
the searches can yield evidence of far more serious crimes. Id.  Logan writes that the arrest 
and search for the trivial local offense can serve as “an investigative fulcrum to increase 
criminal liability (sometimes radically).” Id. at 1442.  In one case he cites, an arrest for a 
municipal offense prohibiting the riding of a bicycle on a sidewalk resulted in a fifteen-year 
prison sentence for illegal firearm possession. Id. at 1442 n.200 (citing United States v. 
McFadden, 238 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2001)).  Of course, the prosecutors never pursued the 
municipal charge, and the defendant was never convicted of it. United States v. McFadden, 
238 F.3d 198, 199–200 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 11. See Local Governments by Type and State:  2012, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www2.census.gov/govs/cog/2012/formatted_prelim_counts_23jul2012_2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W3LH-UT6Q] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). 
 12. Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law Reform and the Persistence of Strict Liability, 62 
DUKE L.J. 285, 287–88 (2012). 
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offense definitions and the rejection of strict liability.13  While these 
categories can be largely viewed as historical in origin (relating to the 
adoption, or not, of Model Penal Code-type practices), they contain enduring 
normative content as well:  clarity in offense definition, especially with 
respect to mens rea requirements, facilitates post hoc adjudication of liability 
and grading, while also constraining arbitrary discretion.14 
The criminal offenses of localities, I found, often fall into the archaic 
category.  Most significantly, I observed that many—perhaps the majority—
of local offenses that I studied lacked textual culpability requirements.  
Consider a few examples from the following localities: 
Table 1:  A Sampling of Archaic Local Offenses 
Greenfield, 
Missouri 
“It shall be illegal for any person to throw rocks or any 
other substance or material at any person in the 
municipality . . . .”15 
Omaha, 
Nebraska 
“No person shall own, keep or harbor . . . any dangerous 
dog or other dangerous animal without said dog or other 
animal being confined . . . .”16 
Cincinnati, 
Ohio 
“[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to be an employee 
of a sexually oriented business in the city of Cincinnati 
without a valid license.”17 
 
These offenses allow for liability even absent a culpable mental state, and 
their act elements are also very broad.  The Greenfield offense, for example, 
would cover an afterschool snowball fight.  This would be a ridiculous 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Thus, clarity and culpability in offense definition enhance criminal law’s function as 
a “decision rule” but not necessarily a “conduct rule.” See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules 
and Conduct Rules:  On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 656 
(1984). 
 15. GREENFIELD, MO., CODE § 210.690 (2020). 
 16. State v. Ruisi, 616 N.W.2d 19, 24 (Neb. 2000) (quoting OMAHA, NEB., CODE § 6-105 
(1980) (current version at OMAHA, NEB., CODE § 6-149 (2020))).  The definition of “dangerous 
dog” is then described in greater detail, but there is no requirement of the owner’s mens rea 
with respect to the dangerousness once the dog fits the criteria. Id. at 26 (“Proof of prior 
knowledge that the dog had dangerous propensities is not required, nor is proof of any criminal 
intent required.”).  A sentence of six months imprisonment and six months probation was 
affirmed by the court. Id. at 26–27. 
 17. State v. Valentine, No. C-070388, 2008 WL 1758081, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 18, 
2008) (quoting CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE § 899-5(b) (2020)).  The court reversed the 
conviction due to erroneous instructions at the plea colloquy but also suggested in dicta that 
the defendant’s attack on the strict liability interpretation of the statute was not meritorious:   
We recognize the necessary existence of certain criminal strict-liability statutes.  It 
does not violate the common good or fundamental fairness to place the prohibition 
of operating a sexually-oriented business without a license into this category, along 
with a myriad of other strict-liability offenses such as speeding, driving under the 
influence, and violating the many other licensing requirements for conducting 
business in the city. 
Id. at *2. 
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application, but substantive criminal laws like this do not guide or constrain 
an adjudicator so as to prevent that ridiculous application. 
That local offenses are often written in the archaic form is interesting in its 
own right, but the greater significance of this finding is that one must 
consider that these archaic local offenses exist underneath (or alongside) 
state criminal codes that are usually written differently.  As will be discussed, 
a majority of states (twenty-seven) have implemented culpability 
presumptions enabling code-wide element analysis; these states, therefore, 
have thoroughly “modern” offense-drafting practices.18  In this majority of 
states, though, localities can and do promulgate archaic offenses.  Important 
concerns arise when there is this type of mismatch between local and state 
offense-drafting practices. 
Take, for example, an offense created by Kansas City, Missouri, that was 
ultimately interpreted by the Supreme Court of Missouri.19  The city 
promulgated the following offense: 
Any person who shall in any way or manner hinder, obstruct, molest, resist 
or otherwise interfere with . . . any member of the police force in the 
discharge of his official duties shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.20 
The offense had no textual mens rea requirement, but the analogous state 
offense required that the interference be “willful.”21  In the case reviewed by 
the state high court, the defendant locked the door on officers who were 
attempting a warrantless entry of her home in order to arrest her teenage son 
(for cursing at them).22  The elimination of the state’s mens rea requirement 
in the city’s offense foreclosed the defendant’s argument that she lacked 
willfulness because she believed she had a right to exclude the officers.23 
Asymmetry between archaic local offenses and modern criminal offenses 
should be called “harmful asymmetry” because in these circumstances, the 
home rule powers of local governments have allowed them to counteract the 
states’ advances in criminal offense drafting.  Broad, strict liability offenses 
proliferate in these localities, and the result is that lawmaking authority is 
effectively delegated to law enforcement.  As William Stuntz observed in 
another context, “[b]road criminal law . . . means that the law as enforced 
will differ from the law on the books.  And the former will be defined by law 
enforcers, by prosecutors’ decisions to prosecute and police decisions to 
arrest.”24  While efforts to modernize state criminal codes aimed to mitigate 
this pathology by constraining official discretion with clear adjudication 
rules (especially culpability requirements), local criminalization undoes this 
mitigation. 
 
 18. See infra Part II.A. 
 19. Kansas City v. LaRose, 524 S.W.2d 112 (Mo. 1975). 
 20. Id. at 116 (quoting KANSAS CITY, MO., CODE § 26.35 (1967) (current version at 
KANSAS CITY, MO., CODE § 50-44 (2020))). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 115. 
 23. Id. at 117–19. 
 24. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 
519 (2001). 
2020] LOCAL OFFENSES 843 
While this Article is concerned mostly with the effects of harmful criminal 
law asymmetry, and not its causes, two hypotheses are worth considering.  It 
may be that local offenses are drafted in the archaic form because of 
institutional incompetence.  Smaller populations, fewer attorneys and 
legislative staff, and limited attention of outside experts may all contribute to 
an overall reduced institutional competence of city councils and town boards.  
In cases that cannot be explained by incompetence,25 an alternative cause 
may be deliberate overbreadth.  The locality aims to overdeter by producing 
what Dan Kahan calls a “‘prudence of obfuscation’ . . . designed to induce 
uncertainty and restraint among persons who seek to pursue undesirable 
behaviors within the literal terms of legal rules.”26 
As should be apparent, the primary goal of this Article is descriptive:  to 
unearth the existence of archaic local criminal law and to mark a contrast 
with modern drafting practices prevalent in many state codes.  A secondary 
goal, though, is to note the implications of this observation for two 
contemporary scholarly conversations. 
The first body of literature, mentioned briefly above,27 aims to assess the 
dimensions of the misdemeanor criminal justice system.  We can call it the 
“misdemeanorland” scholarship (after the name given to the system by a 
prominent book).28  Commentators writing about misdemeanorland 
emphasize, among other things, that the misdemeanor system often acts 
lawlessly, with officials ignoring substantive criminal law.29  For example, 
one scholar recounts that the South Bronx police routinely arrested 
individuals for trespass while ignoring the requirement in New York law that 
the individual be present “unlawfully.”30  If one incorporates harmful local-
state asymmetry into this analysis, one sees that the observations of 
misdemeanorland scholars are often compounded or worsened by local 
criminal offenses.  As discussed above, archaic offenses, especially those that 
lack mental elements, provide textual license through their overbreadth for 
unconstrained official discretion.31  Imagine that the New York City Council 
created a local trespass offense lacking an “unlawfully” element or a mens 
rea element—in other words, creating strict liability for “entering” or 
 
 25. These factors cannot explain the persistence of archaic offenses in large cities, such 
as New York and Los Angeles, or in localities where the drafting appears to be deliberate. See 
City of Dayton v. Dye, No. 9539, 1986 WL 12353, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 30, 1986) 
(discussing a strict liability dog control ordinance and stating that “[l]ack of intent or 
knowledge is not a defense to violation of this section”). 
 26. Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1501 n.30 
(2008) (quoting Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse—but Only for the Virtuous, 
96 MICH. L. REV. 127, 129 (1997)). 
 27. See supra notes 3–4. 
 28. See generally ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND:  CRIMINAL COURTS AND 
SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2018). 
 29. See infra Part V.A.  I will not attempt to prove or disprove either hypothesis here and 
raise them only for the purpose of discussion. 
 30. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1359 (2012) (citing 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.10 (McKinney 2012)). 
 31. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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“remaining” on certain property.  In this case, the lawlessness exhibited by 
the South Bronx police would be effectively ratified by the offense definition. 
The phenomenon of archaic local offenses is also relevant for a second 
important scholarly conversation:  the movement to “democratize” criminal 
justice.32  The “democratization” movement addresses the problem of 
racialized mass incarceration and blames the current criminal justice 
system’s “bureaucratic” prioritization of expertise and efficiency as creating 
excessively punitive outcomes.33  This can be contrasted with the desires of 
the general public, whose moral viewpoints—if allowed to have efficacy—
would result in greater leniency.34  A latent theme in the works of the 
democratizers is a subsidiarity-type principle in which smaller governmental 
units (even down to the neighborhood level) are preferable.35  Harmful 
asymmetry between archaic local offenses and modern state offenses, it 
seems, presents a counterexample to the larger claims of the democratizers.  
When it comes to offense drafting, it is the larger state jurisdiction, informed 
by expertise, that produces the superior criminal offenses.  The smaller local 
jurisdictions, more representative of the lay public, produce offenses that 
allow for the harmful effects mentioned above.36  And all because of either 
incompetence or deliberately punitive intentions. 
More generally, the claims of this Article, if accepted, should serve as 
cautionary tales.  While scholars writing about misdemeanors and those 
writing about democratization have different focuses, these two groups both 
share an optimism about localism.37  The phenomenon of harmful asymmetry 
should concern proponents of localism; it is evidence that in the context of 
criminal offense drafting, the threat posed by localism is greater than the 
opportunity.38 
This Article proceeds as follows:  Part I marks out and describes two 
categories of offense drafting forms—archaic and modern—as well as the 
purposes served by modern drafting methods.  Drawing on past fifty-state 
surveys, Part II assesses the American state-level jurisdictions, placing each 
state into either the archaic or modern category.  Part III offers the central 
descriptive contribution of this Article:  an analysis of local criminal codes 
and offenses, with the conclusion that local offenses are often drafted in the 
archaic form.  In Part IV, a troubling scenario is described—a geographic 
overlap, but legal mismatch, between archaic local offenses and modern state 
offenses that both apply in the same place at the same time.  The implications 
 
 32. See generally Joshua Kleinfeld et al., Policy Proposals:  White Paper of Democratic 
Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1693 (2017). 
 33. Id. at 1694. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See infra Part V.B. 
 36. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 37. See infra notes 274–79. 
 38. One might wonder whether localism has resulted in examples of “beneficial 
asymmetry”—where a locality created modern offenses while the state remained stuck in an 
archaic form.  I do not deny that this is possible or that this phenomenon can be discovered 
after a broader study of local criminal codes.  However, I did search for beneficial asymmetry 
but was unable to find it.  I leave consideration of this possibility for another day. 
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of this harmful local-state asymmetry are discussed, and two tentative causal 
hypotheses are raised:  reduced local institutional competence or deliberate 
local overdeterrence through broad offense drafting.  Finally, Part V draws 
out the relevant implications of archaic local offenses and harmful local-state 
asymmetry for important contemporary debates in criminal justice 
scholarship.  These include the recent literature addressing the misdemeanor 
system, as well as the democratization movement. 
I.  MODERN AND ARCHAIC OFFENSE DRAFTING 
Before describing the form of local criminal law, and also that of the state 
criminal law under which it operates, it is important to lay out two categories 
for future application.  All efforts at categorization run the risk of 
generalization, but with respect to criminal offense-drafting practices, 
categorization is made easier by history.  The development of American 
criminal law leads one to conclude that at the most basic level, criminal 
offenses have been written in two different styles, each characteristic of a 
different era of legislation.  While the distinction is primarily historical, the 
history reflects a conceptual divide that still remains. 
We can begin with history.  Midway through the twentieth century, 
American criminal law was in an underdeveloped state.  Consider the 
observation of Herbert Wechsler in 1956:  “Viewing the country as a whole, 
our penal codes are fragmentary, old, disorganized and often accidental in 
their coverage, their growth largely fortuitous in origin, their form a 
combination of enactment and of common law that only history explains.”39  
As Darryl Brown writes, “[a] tradition of poor drafting plagued these [pre-
War] statutes, so they commonly employed multiple mens rea terms and 
conduct-defining terms in the same offense” and were also “encrusted with 
ill-defined common-law terms such as ‘malice aforethought.’”40  Even 
serious offenses such as murder were not clearly defined by statute, leaving 
judges to step in and fill in undefined terms with meaning drawn from older 
common law.41 
 
 39. Herbert Wechsler, The American Law Institute:  Some Observations on Its Model 
Penal Code, 42 A.B.A. J. 321, 321 (1956) [hereinafter Wechsler, Some Observations]; see 
also Herbert Wechsler, American Law Institute:  II  A Thoughtful Code of Substantive Law, 
45 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 524, 526 (1955) [hereinafter Wechsler, A 
Thoughtful Code] (“As our statutes stand at present, they are disorganized and often accidental 
in their coverage, a medley of enactment and of common law, far more important in their gloss 
than in their text even in cases where the text is fairly full, a combination of the old and of the 
new that only history explains.  Often a larger, integrative impulse is reflected in the traffic 
law than in provisions dealing with the major crimes for which the major sanctions are 
employed.”). 
 40. Brown, supra note 12, at 287. 
 41. Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 
1100–01 (1952) (“They put an even larger challenge since we know in what large part their 
grounds are accidental or fortuitous—an old decision deemed to be authoritative, the mood 
that dominated a tribunal or a legislature at strategic moments in the past, a flurry of public 
excitement on some single matter, the imitative aspects of so much of our penal legislation, 
the absence of effective legislative reconsiderations of the problems posed.”); see Paul H. 
Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code:  A Brief Overview, 10 NEW 
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Thus, in 1951, the American Law Institute (ALI), “a nongovernmental 
organization of highly regarded judges, lawyers, and law professors,” set out 
to create a new, model code, the Model Penal Code (MPC).42  Wechsler was 
chief reporter.43  According to historians of the MPC, Paul Robinson and 
Markus Dubber, the ALI’s goals were to “simplify and rationalize the 
hodgepodge of common law offense definitions.”44  This was accomplished 
first by creating what is now known as “element analysis”—the approach by 
which an offense is divided into discrete components for the purpose of proof 
and judicial scrutiny.45  Moreover, the number of mental elements was 
reduced to four, and each had a definition that courts could use.46  This 
enabled each conduct, result, or circumstance element to be assigned a mental 
state.  Element analysis, combined with the new mens rea schema, worked to 
enhance the clarity of offenses and to ensure that culpability was required.  
Brown summarizes:  the “two ambitions” of the project were “to bring 
analytical clarity to the definition and interpretation of criminal statutes” and 
to “reject[] strict liability for any element of a crime.”47 
The MPC had a significant impact on the development of criminal codes 
after its promulgation.  Robinson and Dubber describe a “wave of state code 
reforms in the 1960s and 1970s, each influenced by the Model Penal Code.”48  
In total, they count thirty-four reforms influenced by it in some way.49  Even 
critics of the MPC, such as George Fletcher, concede that it has had great 
impact:  “The Model Penal Code has become the central document of 
American criminal justice.”50  However, if only thirty-four states were 
influenced by the reforms, this means that many others ignored them.  Draft 
reforms that were explicitly considered by certain state legislatures after the 
MPC were rejected in eight states,51 while other states appear to have simply 
done nothing.  Thus, the “fragmentary, old, disorganized and often 
 
CRIM. L. REV. 319, 323 (2007) (“A typical American criminal code at the time was less a code 
and more a collection of ad hoc statutory enactments, each enactment triggered by a crime or 
a crime problem that gained public interest for a time.”). 
 42. Robinson & Dubber, supra note 41, at 323 (“When the institute undertook its work on 
criminal law, however, it judged the existing law too chaotic and irrational to merit 
‘restatement.’”). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 334. 
 45. Id. at 334–35. 
 46. Id.  The mental states were purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. Id. 
 47. Brown, supra note 12, at 287 (footnote omitted). 
 48. Robinson & Dubber, supra note 41, at 320. 
 49. Id. at 326. 
 50. George P. Fletcher, Dogmas of the Model Penal Code, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 3, 3 
(1998); see also Michael Serota, Proportional Mens Rea and the Future of Criminal Code 
Reform, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1201, 1201 (2017) (“And it was due in large part to the 
drafters’ success in addressing these problems that the second half of the twentieth century 
witnessed a cascade of criminal code reform projects structured around the Model Penal 
Code’s general mens rea provisions.”). 
 51. Robinson & Dubber, supra note 41, at 326 (“Draft criminal codes produced in other 
states, such as California, Massachusetts, Michigan, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, 
Vermont, and West Virginia, did not pass legislative review and may yet be revived.”). 
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accidental”52 criminal laws criticized by Wechsler in 1956 were left largely 
intact in many jurisdictions.53  History, then, does much work in explaining 
how there is a rough division between two different forms of criminal law. 
There is a conceptual distinction that is the product of this history, 
though—it is the distinction between codes with offenses that facilitate 
element analysis and those that impede it or render it impossible.  The most 
important feature of an offense in this regard is the clarity of the culpability 
requirement for each objective offense element.  The demand for an easily 
discernable mens rea is in part a search for clarity as to what the law requires 
in terms of culpability for each element, but it also has a substantive 
component that goes beyond mere clarity and aims to protect innocent 
conduct.54  As we saw, the perceived importance of clarity in culpability 
requirements made culpability the centerpiece of the ALI’s reform effort. 
Clear culpability requirements are most important in that they function as 
a guide for judges and juries to determine ex post whether conduct gives rise 
to criminal liability and, if so, for what grade of offense.  These aspects of 
offense definition increase the offense’s value as a “decision rule” or 
“adjudication rule,” then, and not so much as a “conduct rule,” or a guide for 
the average citizen to act in a certain way.55  Thus, when assessing whether 
a criminal code “provide[s] a comprehensive and accessible statement of its 
rules of adjudication,”56 Paul Robinson, Michael Cahill, and Usman 
Mohammad ask first whether the offenses have clear culpability 
requirements.57  These help to create robust adjudication rules that 
 
 52. Wechsler, Some Observations, supra note 39, at 3; see also Wechsler, A Thoughtful 
Code, supra note 39, at 526 (“As our statutes stand at present, they are disorganized and often 
accidental in their coverage, a medley of enactment and of common law, far more important 
in their gloss than in their text even in cases where the text is fairly full, a combination of the 
old and of the new that only history explains.  Often a larger, integrative impulse is reflected 
in the traffic law than in provisions dealing with the major crimes for which the major 
sanctions are employed.”). 
 53. For this reason, near the beginning of the twenty-first century, George Fletcher did 
not hesitate to call California’s criminal code a “19th century state code.” Fletcher, supra note 
50, at 3. 
 54. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (“The contention that an 
injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient 
notion.  It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the 
human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good 
and evil.”). 
 55. See Paul H. Robinson et al., The Five Worst (and Five Best) American Criminal 
Codes, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000) (distinguishing between the “rule articulation function” 
of criminal law in which it “provide[s] ex ante direction to members of the community” and 
the “adjudication function” in which it “must decide whether the violation merits criminal 
liability and, if so, how much”); see also Dan-Cohen, supra note 14, at 630. 
 56. Robinson et al., supra note 55, at 12 (capitalization altered for readability). 
 57. Id. at 13 (“Without an exhaustive delineation of culpability requirements, the 
relationship between those requirements, and the manner in which the requirements will be 
applied to the rules of conduct, a criminal code has done only half its job:  it has codified each 
actus reus without any explanation of the corresponding mens rea necessary for criminal 
punishment.”); id. at 14 (“The goal of uniformity in application requires that the code make 
clear which seemingly different offenders merit punishment in equal measure and which 
superficially similar offenders must be treated differently from one another.  Similar cases 
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“increase[] uniformity” across similar cases and counteract “unguided 
discretion in decisionmakers, which can breed disparity in application and 
create the potential for abuse.”58 
In sum, historical efforts to reform the criminal law were motivated by a 
desire to clarify the culpability requirements of offenses, thus enabling 
element analysis and providing guidance for adjudicators while constraining 
their discretion.  These efforts had great impact on actual codes, but this 
impact was not universal.  The result is that the law today reflects a division 
between criminal offenses with clear culpability requirements and those 
without them.  For this reason, we shall use the strength of a jurisdiction’s 
adherence to the values of clarity and culpability as the litmus test for a larger 
categorization—what we might think of as the general tenor of the 
jurisdiction’s offense-drafting practices.  Going forward, if a jurisdiction 
reproduces the efforts of the ALI by creating a clear criminal law with 
culpability requirements, it will be categorized as a jurisdiction with 
“modern” offense-drafting practices.  If it fails to do so, it will be categorized 
as having “archaic” practices. 
Of course, the MPC hardly seems modern at this point, and many opaque, 
strict liability offenses may not be old at all.  However, given the above 
history, it makes sense to categorize jurisdictions in temporal or historical 
terms—as those who made substantial efforts to reform and those who stayed 
stuck with their traditional codes.  These terms avoid the imprecision of the 
labels “common-law states” and “Model Penal Code states.”59  “Substantial” 
should be emphasized because no state adopted the MPC jot for jot, and the 
thirty-four states that did promptly reform their codes in response to the MPC 
fall along a spectrum in terms of adherence to its principles.60 
 
must be treated equally, and different cases must be distinguished according to well-defined 
principles . . . .  Greater detail serves to confine the adjudicator’s discretion and focus her 
attention on relevant considerations rather than allowing her to be swayed by unimportant 
concerns.”). 
 58. Id. at 12. 
 59.  
Few tropes in American legal teaching are more firmly entrenched than the criminal 
law division between Model Penal Code (“MPC”) and common law states.  Yet 
even a cursory look at current state codes indicates that this bifurcation is outmoded.  
No state continues to cling to ancient English common law, nor does any state fully 
adhere to the MPC.  In fact, those states that adopted portions of the MPC have since 
produced a substantial body of case law—what this Article terms “new common 
law”—transforming it. 
Anders Walker, The New Common Law:  Courts, Culture, and the Localization of the Model 
Penal Code, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1633, 1634 (2011).  Walker’s criticism of the “common law” 
label seems to be that this gives the impression that the state’s criminal law is mostly judge-
made and inherited from England, but it is not clear that the term is used in this way in the 
casebooks he references. Id. at 1636–37.  It may be that “common law” simply meant older 
American interpretations of nebulous statutes—the target of the MPC’s reforms.  Walker’s 
criticism of the term “Model Penal Code state” is more significant, as this does give the reader 
or student the impression that the MPC was adopted jot for jot. Id. at 1648.  Walker urges 
scholars and teachers to refer to what are normally called “common law” states as “indigenous 
code states.” Id. at 1638. 
 60.  
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II.  THE FORM(S) OF STATE CRIMINAL LAW 
We now have a working definition of two categories of criminal offense-
drafting practices—archaic and modern—but have yet to apply these 
categories to any contemporary jurisdictions.  Before assessing the local 
government jurisdictions that are the primary focus of this Article, it is first 
necessary to lay the groundwork for comparison and contextualization by 
describing practices amongst the states.  Below, I classify twenty-seven state 
jurisdictions as having modern criminal codes and twenty-four jurisdictions 
(including Washington, D.C.) as having archaic criminal codes. 
A.  Modern Codes 
As said above, a modern code for purposes of this Article is a code that 
substantially reformed its criminal code in response to the MPC—most 
especially by enhancing clarity with respect to culpability requirements that 
were previously absent or confusing.  The most important advancement of 
the MPC in this regard was the requirement of element analysis, and the 
crucial sections in this regard are subsections (3) and (4) of section 2.02, 
which, respectively, establish a recklessness default for all material elements 
and the transposition of any explicit mental element to all other material 
elements.61  Without using the term “element analysis,” Wechsler himself 
later reflected on these provisions as “invit[ing] attention to the wisdom of 
such stark distinctions as to culpability respecting different elements of an 
offense.”62  If a code has adopted the above provisions, it has been infused 
with the most important advancement of the code reform movement—it can 
be called “modern.” 
 
While thirty-four states adopted portions of the MPC, no state adopted all of it.  Even 
states that adopted much of it—New York, Illinois, and Missouri are examples—
tended to amend MPC definitions with new legislation.  Why?  A brief look at the 
archaeology of state codes indicates that those portions of the MPC that challenged 
local, cultural values tended to fail, while those sections that simply reiterated what 
many people already felt tended to succeed.  This rendered so-called “MPC” states 
hybrid regimes that enjoyed some of the modern innovations provided by the MPC, 
yet retained distinctive aspects of older, more local law. 
Id. at 1646; see also Dannye Holley, The Influence of the Model Penal Code’s Culpability 
Provisions on State Legislatures:  A Study of Lost Opportunities, Including Abolishing the 
Mistake of Fact Doctrine, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 229, 229 n.2 (1997) (“Herbert Wechsler . . . in 
1984 . . . asserted that since the Unofficial Draft was published in 1963, some 34 states had 
enacted new penal codes.  Wechsler concluded that all of these enactments were influenced to 
varying degrees by the Model Penal Code, but acknowledged that some states had gone much 
further than others in emulating the innovations found in the Model Penal Code.”). 
 61. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (AM. L. INST. 1985) (“Culpability Required Unless 
Otherwise Provided.  When the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an 
offense is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts purposely, 
knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto.”); id. § 2.02(4) (“Prescribed Culpability 
Requirement Applies to All Material Elements.  When the law defining an offense prescribes 
the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of an offense, without 
distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all the 
material elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.”). 
 62. Herbert Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States:  The Model 
Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1437 (1968). 
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In choosing this as the focal point for the categorization, I begin with the 
2012 study undertaken by Darryl Brown, in which he marks out a core group 
of twenty-four states that have an “identifiable variation” of section 2.02(3) 
and section 2.02(4); he uses this as the touchstone for whether or not a state 
can be categorized as an “MPC state” (in our terminology, a “modern” 
code).63  Brown includes the following states64: 
Table 2:  Brown’s MPC States 
Alabama Colorado Indiana Maine New York Pennsylvania 
Alaska Connecticut Illinois Missouri North Dakota Tennessee 
Arizona Delaware Kansas New Hampshire Ohio Texas 
Arkansas Hawaii Kentucky New Jersey Oregon Utah 
 
While Brown’s survey was invaluable in finding a baseline group of 
modern states, I add two additional jurisdictions that he analyzed but did not 
include:  Montana and Washington.  Brown explicitly considered whether or 
not to include these in his typology but decided against it because the 
jurisdictions’ culpability provisions strayed too far from MPC rules.65  For 
purposes of this Article, though, they should be considered modern because 
they nevertheless reflect requirements of element analysis.66  Finally, one 
state must be added to Brown’s list because it reformed its code after his 
study was complete:  Michigan added MPC-type culpability presumptions 
and definitions in 2015.67 
 
 63. Brown, supra note 12, at 294 (“I first reviewed all state criminal codes to identify 
those that codify an identifiable variation of the MPC’s key interpretive rules and 
presumptions regarding culpability requirements for elements of criminal offenses . . . .”). 
 64. Id. at 295 (citing code provisions). 
 65. Id. at 289 n.8 (“I exclude Montana’s code because it includes no version of MPC 
§ 2.02(3) or § 2.02(4), even though it reflects MPC influence because its code requires at least 
negligence ‘with respect to each element described by the statute.’  This negligence 
requirement was adapted from MPC § 2.02(1) and § 2.05.  Washington is also excluded 
because its code lacks any reference to the MPC’s mens rea presumptions, although its 
definitions of culpability terms track the MPC.” (citations omitted) (first quoting MONT. CODE. 
ANN. §§ 45-2-103, 45-2-104 (2011); and then quoting WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.08.010 
(2009))). 
 66. Id.  Montana’s reduction of the default from recklessness to negligence is a significant 
departure from the MPC but still requires element analysis. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-103 
(2020).  Washington’s omission of any mens rea presumption is more significant, but my study 
of Washington’s code shows that element analysis is baked into almost all of the specific 
offenses.  These offense definitions accomplish what the presumptions do not. See, e.g., 
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010 (2020) (adopting mental states that very closely resemble 
MPC mental states); id. § 9A.36.011 (“A person is guilty of assault in the first degree if he or 
she, with intent to inflict great bodily harm:  (a) Assaults another with a firearm or any deadly 
weapon or by any force or means likely to produce great bodily harm or death . . . .”). 
 67. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 8.9 (2020). 
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The adoption of the key interpretive principles of element analysis, though, 
serves as but a proxy for the larger state of the jurisdiction’s code.  When one 
looks at individual offenses in the above twenty-seven modern jurisdictions, 
they mostly conform to the good drafting practices discussed above:  clear, 
discernible elements and a mental element somewhere to be found.68  
Consider an offense representing the core of the concerns of criminal law—
physical assault (sometimes called battery)—and note how this offense is 
defined in a sampling of the modern states (the lowest grade of the offense is 
excerpted): 
Table 3:  A Sampling of Modern Assault Statutes 
Arizona 
“A person commits assault by:  1. Intentionally, knowingly or 
recklessly causing any physical injury to another person; or 2. 
Intentionally placing another person in reasonable apprehension 
of imminent physical injury; or 3. Knowingly touching another 
person with the intent to injure, insult or provoke such person.”69 
Illinois 
“A person commits battery if he or she knowingly without legal 
justification by any means (1) causes bodily harm to an 
individual or (2) makes physical contact of an insulting or 
provoking nature with an individual.”70 
New 
Jersey 
“A person is guilty of assault if the person:  (1) Attempts to cause 
or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to 
another; or (2) Negligently causes bodily injury to another with 
a deadly weapon; or (3) Attempts by physical menace to put 
another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.”71 
Oregon 
“A person commits the crime of assault in the fourth degree if 
the person:  (a) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes 
physical injury to another; (b) With criminal negligence causes 
physical injury to another by means of a deadly weapon; or (c) 
With criminal negligence causes serious physical injury to 
another who is a vulnerable user of a public way . . . by means 
of a motor vehicle.”72
 
 68. Note that I say only that a mental element is found somewhere—not that it is present 
with respect to every material element.  The requirement of a mental element for all material 
objective elements was a goal of the MPC drafters, yet Brown notes that even in his cohort of 
MPC states, this requirement has been undercut by judicial interpretations by state high courts. 
Brown, supra note 12, at 300.  Thus, in MPC states, one can only be assured of the fact that 
“pure” strict liability offenses would be invalid. See Kenneth W. Simons, When Is Strict 
Criminal Liability Just?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1081 (1997) (labeling an 
offense without any mental elements a “pure” strict liability statute).  This guarantee should 
not be taken lightly, though:  it means that conduct that is undertaken with a wholly innocent 
mental state cannot be criminally punished.  It would invalidate, for example, Florida’s widely 
criticized drug possession statute. See FLA. STAT. § 893.13 (2020); State v. Adkins, 96 So. 3d 
412 (Fla. 2012) (holding section 893.13 to be constitutional). 
 69. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1203 (2020). 
 70. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-3 (2020). 
 71. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1 (West 2020). 
 72. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.160 (2020). 
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While only New Jersey’s offense adopts language identical to that of the 
MPC’s assault offense,73 the other three states all bear the markings of the 
MPC’s element analysis approach.  Different objective elements are cleanly 
differentiated, and the mental element applicable to each is unambiguous.  
There is no outmoded language. 
As this exercise shows, within the core offenses,74 modern code states 
write their offenses using the modern form, paying attention to the values of 
clarity and culpability, even if they modify its exact text. 
B.  Archaic Codes 
That we have counted only twenty-seven jurisdictions with modern 
offense-drafting practices, though, is a clue that the remaining states likely 
write criminal laws differently.  As mentioned above, the code reform efforts 
in the twentieth century were not universally successful, leaving the old 
criminal law on the books in many jurisdictions.75 
For this reason, I categorize the remaining twenty-four jurisdictions as 
those that maintain a code with offenses drafted in the archaic form.  This is 
partly historical, as just mentioned, but also conceptual.  Since the status quo 
in American criminal law was an offense-drafting practice that failed to 
enhance the values of clarity and culpability, the failure to participate in the 
code reform movement during the mid-twentieth century means that these 
nonparticipating jurisdictions have many unclear offenses with confusing or 
absent culpability requirements.  As Judge Gerard Lynch observed, “the 
 
 73. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (AM. L. INST. 1985). 
 74. This claim is less true with respect to the ad hoc creation of offenses outside of the 
core code.  As observed by Paul Robinson and Michael Cahill in multiple articles written from 
2000 to 2010, “the decades since the wave of Model Code-based codifications have seen a 
steady degradation of American codes brought on by a relentless and accelerating rate of 
criminal law amendments that ignore the style, format, and content of the existing codes.” 
Paul H. Robinson et al., The Modern Irrationalities of American Criminal Codes:  An 
Empirical Study of Offense Grading, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 709, 709 (2010); see 
also Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code Second Save the States 
from Themselves?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 170 (2003) [hereinafter Robinson & Cahill, 
Model Penal Code Second] (“This degradation process has several sources.  One is special-
interest-group lobbying . . . .  Another engine of code degradation is the normal news-
story/political-response cycle.  A high-profile series of offenses, or even one particularly 
serious offense, upsets the community.  The legislators, understandably, feel that they need to 
demonstrate their appreciation of the community concern and to do something in response to 
it.”); Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of American 
Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 634 (2005) (“The main form of degradation is the 
proliferation of numerous new offenses that duplicate, but may be inconsistent with, prior 
existing offenses.”); Robinson et al., supra note 55, at 2.  As new ad hoc criminal offenses are 
created for various reasons at various times, the MPC-based code becomes less and less 
representative of the state of criminal law in the jurisdiction—just as “barnacles collecting on 
the hull of a ship” can at some point “dwarf[] the ship.” Robinson & Cahill, Model Penal Code 
Second, supra, at 172.  Robinson and Cahill’s observations are significant, however, for the 
purposes of comparison of codes:  even the barnacle-encrusted ship of the modern states seems 
better than a ship entirely composed of barnacles. 
 75. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. 
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jurisdictions that failed to adopt the MPC in its heyday have the worst and 
most confusing codes today.”76  These twenty-four jurisdictions are: 
Table 4:  Archaic Code States 
California Maryland New Mexico Vermont 
Florida Massachusetts North Carolina Virginia 
Georgia Minnesota Oklahoma Washington, D.C. 
Idaho Mississippi Rhode Island West Virginia 
Iowa Nebraska South Carolina Wisconsin 
Louisiana Nevada South Dakota Wyoming 
 
Repeating the exercise above, it is revealing to look at the assault or battery 
offense in a sampling of these jurisdictions: 
Table 5:  A Sampling of Archaic Assault Statutes 
California “A battery is any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another.”77
Maryland 
“‘Assault’ means the crimes of assault, battery, and 
assault and battery, which retain their judicially 
determined meanings.”78
Massachusetts “Whoever commits an assault or an assault and battery upon another shall be punished by imprisonment . . . .”79 
Rhode Island “[E]very person who shall make an assault or battery or both shall be imprisoned . . . .”80
 
In these sample states, unlike those sampled in the modern code group, 
very little work is done to define the offense in terms of discrete elements or 
to assign a culpability element.  Massachusetts and Rhode Island make no 
effort to define the words “assault” or “battery,” presumably leaving this to 
judicial interpretation, while Maryland delegates this to the judiciary 
explicitly.81  California defines battery in more detail; however, this offense 
lacks the precision of the modern states mentioned earlier and uses the 
imprecise term “willful.”82  The requisite mens rea is unclear. 
 
 76. Gerard E. Lynch, Revising the Model Penal Code:  Keeping It Real, 1 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 219, 224 (2003). 
 77. CAL. PENAL CODE § 242 (West 2020). 
 78. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-201(b) (LexisNexis 2020). 
 79. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13A (2020). 
 80. 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-5-3 (2020). 
 81. Maryland is known as a state that retains a number of common-law crimes. See Carissa 
Byrne Hessick, The Myth of Common Law Crimes, 105 VA. L. REV. 965, 981–82 (2019) 
(listing fifteen states “that recognize the common law authority of judges to convict for 
conduct that is not criminalized by statute”). 
 82. An attempt to find judicial elaboration of the “willfulness” requirement also leads one 
to unsatisfying results. See People v. Pinholster, 824 P.2d 571, 622 (Cal. 1992) (appearing to 
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A substantial minority of American state-level jurisdictions, then, can be 
said to have archaic offense-drafting practices.  In these twenty-four states, 
the code reform effort in the mid-twentieth century was ignored or failed to 
achieve legislative approval after it was considered.  What remained was the 
product of history—a criminal law whose form did not prioritize the values 
of clear culpability requirements. 
III.  THE FORM(S) OF LOCAL CRIMINAL LAW 
Now that we have a better understanding of the form of offense drafting in 
state-level criminal codes, we may turn to the central subject of this Article:  
the form of local offenses.  Such a study has never been done,83 despite the 
vast reach of this law and the significance of it to the daily lives of nearly all 
Americans. 
A.  The Authority to Create Local Crimes 
Before looking at a number of criminal codes and offenses created by 
localities, it is worth briefly discussing the state constitutional law that gives 
these localities the power to create crimes.  As the U.S. Supreme Court 
observed in United States v. Lopez,84 “[s]tates historically have been 
sovereign” in “areas such as criminal law enforcement.”85  Part of this 
sovereignty, though, has been delegated to inferior intrastate governments—
what most scholars call localities.86  Just as “federalism” describes the 
devolution of political power to the state governments vis-à-vis the federal 
government, “localism” describes state law devolution of lawmaking power 
to villages, cities, towns, and counties.87  As we will see, in the vast majority 
of states, this includes the power to criminalize conduct.  This was not always 
so prevalent. 
Historically, states jealously guarded their lawmaking power against 
localities.  The predominant position in state constitutional law during the 
latter half of the nineteenth century was the so-called “Dillon’s Rule”:  
localities were mere creatures of the state and could be abolished or altered 
by the state at will.88  This position was enshrined as a matter of federal 
constitutional law in the 1907 Supreme Court case Hunter v. Pittsburgh89: 
 
read willfulness as meaning merely harmful or offensive touching and thus rendering the 
requirement superfluous with the act element); see also People v. Shockley, 314 P.3d 798, 803 
(Cal. 2013) (Kennard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (reading Pinholster in the 
manner just described). 
 83. Wayne Logan’s assessment of the local criminal law focused on the substantive 
conduct that was criminalized and its procedural effects. See supra notes 8–10.  Moreover, 
Logan’s study appears to have focused on local criminal laws that were litigated in state courts, 
Logan, supra note 1, at 1426–28, 1426 nn.87–121, but this of course misses many laws that 
are simply “on the books”—or do not yield appellate case law. 
 84. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 85. Id. at 564. 
 86. See, e.g., Briffault, Our Localism:  Part I, supra note 6. 
 87. Id. at 1. 
 88. Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1122 (2007). 
 89. 207 U.S. 161 (1907). 
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Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created as 
convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the 
State as may be entrusted to them . . . .  The number, nature and duration of 
the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which 
they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the State.90 
According to this anemic view of local political power, criminal punishment 
was beyond the power of localities—at least unless it was expressly granted 
by statute. 
Starting in the late nineteenth century, though, Dillon’s Rule was 
challenged.  The emergence of so-called “home rule” by localities meant that 
some state constitutions granted municipal governments “permanent 
substantive lawmaking authority.”91  These early forms of home rule are now 
known as “imperio” home rule regimes, where local power is insulated from 
state legislative curtailment so long as it touches only local (and not 
statewide) matters.92  “[M]any early home-rule regimes established 
essentially separate—and exclusive—sovereigns,” writes Paul Diller, 
“whose areas of authority did not overlap.”93  The consensus at the time, 
though, was that criminal law was not a local concern.  As David Barron 
notes, a leading treatise writer and home rule advocate of the time, Howard 
Lee McBain, included criminal law in a list of nine powers “so obviously 
outside the sphere of local affairs that not even the cities themselves claimed 
to possess them.”94 
In the decades immediately following World War II, home rule reformers 
continued to successfully press for greater and greater lawmaking power for 
localities.95  This next wave of laws, known as “legislative home rule,” 
flipped the presumption of Dillon’s Rule:  they granted a presumption of 
general legislative authority to localities, subject to express limitations 
imposed by the state legislatures.96  Localities could engage in lawmaking 
that was not bounded by subject matter or local concern, but in turn, they lost 
immunity from state law preemption in the areas they legislated in under an 
imperio regime.  As Richard Briffault writes, “[t]he rise of the legislative 
home rule model . . . trades away all immunity in order to assure greater 
 
 90. Id. at 178. 
 91. Diller, supra note 88, at 1124. 
 92. Id. at 1124–25. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Barron, supra note 6, at 2306; see also id. at 2305 n.185 (referring to these powers as 
the “McBain’s Nine”).  But see Logan, supra note 1, at 1414 (“The local power to criminalize 
is neither new nor novel; since colonial times localities have wielded considerable power to 
legislate against perceived forms of social disorder in tandem with, and very often independent 
of, state government.”).  Logan’s evidence for this historical pedigree is an impressively 
researched list of state cases, the oldest of which was decided in 1909. Id. at 1425–28.  It may 
be that the treatise writer, writing those words in 1916, was generalizing about the state of the 
law in past decades and that this status quo was beginning to change.  In any event, the question 
of the precise birthdate of local crimes in American law must be put off for another day. 
 95. Diller, supra note 88, at 1125. 
 96. Id. at 1125–26. 
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scope to local initiative.”97  In legislative home rule states, localities are free 
to punish violations of their ordinances as criminal offenses absent an explicit 
restriction by the legislature. 
The current state of the law shows a mix of the above forms.  The most 
recent fifty-state survey, conducted by Daniel Rodriguez and Lynn Baker in 
2009, reveals the following general breakdown98:  (1) Five states have no 
home rule,99 (2) Twenty-three states have imperio home rule,100 and (3) 
Twenty-three states have legislative home rule.101 
Local crimes can now be found in all three categories.  Alabama, which is 
listed as a non-home rule state by Rodriguez and Baker, nevertheless contains 
municipalities that punish a range of offenses because state law empowers 
them to “adopt ordinances and resolutions not inconsistent with the laws of 
the state.”102  Birmingham, for example, incorporates by reference many 
state offenses but also created its own ordinance punishing domestic violence 
more specifically.103  Baton Rouge, Louisiana, a city in an imperio home rule 
state, punishes disorderly conduct more severely than does the state.104  In 
Murfreesboro, Tennessee, a city in a legislative home rule state, only a small 
number of offenses are punished criminally, including, for example, the 
failure of antique jewelry sellers to maintain a log of their items.105 
Local criminal law proliferates, then, but its basis in state constitutional 
law will depend on the jurisdiction.  But what does this law look like?  How 
are these offenses written?  It is to this central question that we now turn. 
B.  A Note on Method 
A thorough analysis of all local criminal codes is practically impossible.  
First, there is the primary obstacle:  numerosity.  The last U.S. Census in 
2012 revealed 38,917 general purpose local governments in the United 
States.106  These included 3031 county-type governments, 16,364 town-type 
 
 97. Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local Political Innovation, 22 J.L. & POL. 1, 28 
(2006). 
 98. See Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial 
Scrutiny, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1337, 1338–39, 1338 nn.10–12 (2009). 
 99. Id. at 1338 n.10.  However, Nevada appears to have granted a limited home rule after 
Baker and Rodriguez’s study. See NEV. ASS’N OF CNTYS., LIMITED FUNCTIONAL HOME RULE 
(2015), http://www.nvnaco.org/wp-content/uploads/NACO-Home-Rule-White-Paper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/89M5-VNTC]. 
 100. Baker & Rodriquez, supra note 98, at 1339 n.12. 
 101. Id. at 1339 n.11. 
 102. ALA. CODE § 11-45-1 (1975). 
 103. BIRMINGHAM, ALA., CODE § 11-2-8 (1999). 
 104. See City of Baton Rouge v. Williams, 661 So. 2d 445, 447 (La. 1995) (providing the 
language of the city ordinance and the state statute).  The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld 
this ordinance against a preemption claim because the state constitution explicitly marked out 
the punishment of felonies as a matter of statewide concern but not the punishment of 
misdemeanors. Id. at 450. 
 105. MURFREESBORO, TENN., CODE §§ 21-82, 21-84 (2016). 
 106. See Local Governments by Type and State:  2012, supra note 11.  This does not count 
“special purpose” districts such as school and water districts, which were 50,087 in number. 
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governments, and 19,522 municipal or city-type governments.107  Even a 
random sampling of these approximately 40,000 governments would yield a 
number of codes far too large to analyze.108  Moreover, since criminal codes 
are themselves composed of many different criminal offenses—each which 
may be written differently from another—the more relevant statistical 
observation would be the counting and categorization of individual offenses.  
This would then mean that the dataset to study would be many, many times 
more than the approximate 40,000 mentioned above. 
Scholars facing such a daunting obstacle could give up and say nothing 
about the phenomenon.  The current dearth of attention paid to local criminal 
law may be due to a choice on the part of many to take this path, avoiding 
analysis of a vast body of law for fear of making erroneous 
generalizations.109  But this is unsatisfying.  Precisely because of this law’s 
vastness, it also affects the lives of hundreds of millions of people in 
important ways. 
Fortunately, there is another response.  Researchers can aim to say 
something that is not “statistical” or comprehensive but instead engage in a 
descriptive endeavor through the use of examples and representative cases.  
The scholars at the forefront of the burgeoning new literature on the 
misdemeanor criminal justice system (both state and local) help illustrate this 
approach; faced with a similar problem of numerosity and vastness, they 
nonetheless press on with their research.  One method, taken by Issa Kohler-
Hausmann (and earlier by Malcolm Feeley), is to intensely study one 
jurisdiction with the expectation that observations about that jurisdiction will 
be largely true of others like it.110  Another, typified by the work of Alexandra 
Natapoff, is to canvass a large number of examples and to identify trends and 
patterns that become recognizable.111  “No one story—no one jurisdiction—
is fully representative of the system as a whole,” Natapoff admits, but 
examples can nevertheless serve as “warning signs” of a larger system that 
enables them to occur with frequency.112 
 
Id.  It seems unlikely that special purpose districts would be empowered to utilize criminal 
sanctions, and my research has not uncovered any such power. 
 107. Id. 
 108. For example, to achieve the typical “confidence level” used in physical sciences (95 
percent) with a population size of 38,917, the necessary sample size to study would be 7703.  
This would be to achieve a +/- 1 percent margin of error. 
 109. Natapoff makes a similar observation about the misdemeanor system that she studied:  
“Another reason that this book hasn’t been written before is that it is very hard to get national 
information about the petty-offense process.” NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 13. 
 110. See generally MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT:  HANDLING CASES 
IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979) (studying New Haven, Connecticut); KOHLER-
HAUSMANN, supra note 28 (studying New York City). 
 111. NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 16–17. 
 112. Id. at 17; see also Stephanos Bibas, Small Crimes, Big Injustices, 117 MICH. L. REV. 
1025, 1028 (2019) (“The paucity of hard data often forces Natapoff to rely on colorful 
anecdotes.  These can be striking and illuminating, and she tells her stories well.  But the 
stories can simultaneously be frustrating, because a cluster of well-picked anecdotes do not 
add up to data.  Often, Natapoff has no choice and has to tell her story this way.  But skeptical 
readers will at times wonder how representative those anecdotes are and how different 
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In what follows, I will aim to do the same as Natapoff—not to undertake 
a comprehensive study of all local criminal offenses or even a scientifically 
randomized sample—but to highlight a number of localities where a certain 
drafting pattern was observed.  Like Darryl Brown’s study mentioned above, 
I aim only to “identify trends” observed during my encounter with the 
codes.113  In the next section, these trends will be discussed. 
These trends were first observed in an initial group of fourteen local codes 
that I selected using a randomizer application.114  Starting with Rodriguez 
and Baker’s three categories of home rule,115 I randomly selected one 
Dillon’s Rule state, three imperio home rule states, and three legislative home 
rule states.116  Within each state, I chose one city or town randomly and one 
county randomly.  For three counties, I was unable to find any information 
regarding the county code selected and instead read the city code of the 
county seat.  This was the initial group: 
Table 6:  Initial Local Codes Group 
 State City/Town/Village County (city if county unavailable) 
Dillon’s Rule NC Forest City Harnett 
Imperio 
Home Rule VA Newport News King William 
Imperio 
Home Rule FL Perry St. John’s 
Imperio 
Home Rule CT Meriden Middletown (City) 
Legislative 
Home Rule MN Wyoming Waseca 
Legislative 
Home Rule MO Bowling Green Greenfield (City) 
Legislative 
Home Rule NJ Vineland Camden (City) 
 
After this, and to see if very large cities wrote criminal law differently, I 
reviewed the codes of two of the largest U.S. localities, New York City and 
Los Angeles.  I also looked at a small number of municipal governments 
 
anecdotes might cast misdemeanor enforcement in a better light.  Regardless, her plea for 
better information and closer scrutiny is clearly right.”). 
 113. Brown, supra note 12, at 294. 
 114. RANDOM.ORG, https://www.random.org/lists [https://perma.cc/A6TM-LPXT] (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2020). 
 115. See supra note 98. 
 116. I did this because I expected, ex ante, that there might be some differences in the form 
and content of local codes depending on the state constitutional law that authorized the local 
criminalization. 
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specifically located in modern code states to find examples of the harmful 
asymmetry mentioned in the introduction.117 
C.  Local Criminal Law—Observed Trends 
1.  Code Organization 
A good place to begin is the manner in which the codes are organized (if 
the locality has what can even be called a “code”).118  Some trends were 
observed as prevalent. 
First, like in state law, many localities create separate chapters in their 
codes and title them “offenses” or something similar.119  These are the crimes 
that localities are creating most consciously.  Within these “offense” 
chapters, some patterns were noticeable.  Localities sometimes incorporate 
all state law misdemeanors by reference into their local law120 or copy these 
misdemeanors word for word into their codes.121  Other localities do not 
engage in this wholesale copying of state law but instead, pick and choose 
 
 117. Specifically, I analyzed the code of Dodge City, Kansas.  In my review of state 
criminal codes, I was struck by the excellent drafting methods employed by Kansas.  Thus, to 
find an egregious example of asymmetry, I chose a random locality in that state and looked 
for archaic criminal offenses.  Dodge City is described below. See infra notes 173–89. 
 118. Robinson and Cahill observe that disorganization in the collection of a jurisdiction’s 
criminal law is also a problem at the state level. Robinson et al., supra note 55, at 2, 5 (“Indeed, 
many American criminal codes are not true codes at all, in the modern sense of cohesive, well-
structured, and self-contained statutory schemes.  Rather, they are mere collections of statutory 
provisions similar to the generalized legislative ‘codes’ of the last century and before.  In many 
instances, even states that adopted modern, systematic criminal codes—typically during the 
recodification wave of the 1960s and 1970s—have since altered their codes through ad hoc 
amendment, making them dramatically less systematic and internally consistent.”). 
 119. See, e.g., PERRY, FLA., CODE ch. 18 (2019); WYOMING, MINN., CODE ch. 22 (2020); 
BOWLING GREEN, MO., CODE ch. 215 (2020); GREENFIELD, MO., CODE ch. 210 (2020); FOREST 
CITY, N.C., CODE ch. 13 (2019); KING WILLIAM COUNTY, VA., CODE ch. 42 (2018); NEWPORT 
NEWS, VA., CODE ch. 28 (2020). 
 120. E.g., PERRY, FLA., CODE § 18-1(b) (“Unlawful to commit state misdemeanors and 
criminal traffic offenses; adoption of state law.  It shall be unlawful for any person to commit, 
within the corporate limits of the city, any act which is or shall be recognized by the laws of 
the state as a misdemeanor or a criminal traffic offense, and the commission of such acts is 
hereby forbidden.  Such laws are hereby adopted by reference and incorporated as fully as if 
set out at length herein.”). 
 121. See generally BOWLING GREEN, MO., CODE.  Bowling Green has an extensive code 
that includes provisions on modes of liability, such as conspiracy and attempt, and also a vast 
number of substantive offenses.  Compare, for example, the local ordinance definition of 
attempt, id. § 215.020 (“Guilt for an offense may be based upon an attempt to commit an 
offense if, with the purpose of committing the offense, a person performs any act which is a 
substantial step towards the commission of the offense.”), with the state law definition, MO. 
REV. STAT. § 562.012 (2017) (“Guilt for an offense may be based upon an attempt to commit 
an offense if, with the purpose of committing the offense, a person performs any act which is 
a substantial step towards the commission of the offense.”).  Compare also the local ordinance 
definition of assault, BOWLING GREEN, MO., CODE § 215.120 (“The person attempts to cause 
or recklessly causes physical injury, physical pain or illness to another person.”), with the state 
law’s assault in the fourth degree, MO. REV. STAT. § 565.056 (“The person attempts to cause 
or recklessly causes physical injury, physical pain, or illness to another person.”).  A similar 
pattern was observed in the other Missouri locality studied, the city of Greenfield. See 
generally GREENFIELD, MO., CODE ch. 210. 
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what they incorporate.122  Beyond these “copycat” offenses, though, one 
finds a variegated world of what can be called purely local “inventions” 
stuffed into the “offenses” chapters.  These offenses may have state law 
analogues that cover similar conduct, but the text and elements of the 
offenses are not borrowed from state law.  I will discuss these in depth 
below,123 but for now consider two local inventions included in the 
“offenses” section by Newport News, Virginia.  The city punishes 
“engag[ing] in the activity commonly known as ‘trick or treat’” when the 
participant is over the age of twelve or past seventh grade.124  Accompanying 
parents are excepted, but they are forbidden from wearing masks.125  The city 
also created an offense for “[d]irecting [the] beam of [a] laser pen, flashlight 
or similar device into the eyes of another person.”126 
Local criminal law also exists outside “offenses” chapters, though.  Some 
localities promulgate freestanding, locally invented offenses that are placed 
ad hoc throughout the local code and are not delimited within the more 
recognizable chapter of “offenses.”  These local offenses are recognizable as 
criminal in nature because of their sanctions, not their labelling.  Like the 
local inventions just discussed, they are often random in content and difficult 
to characterize.  For example, in the city of Camden, New Jersey, it is a 
criminal offense to “allow or permit ragweed or poison ivy to grow” on one’s 
land127 and also to work as a masseur for a client of the opposite sex.128  This 
 
 122. See, e.g., NEWPORT NEWS, VA., CODE.  The city appears to have adopted many of the 
state-law misdemeanors but not in the same comprehensive fashion as the localities discussed 
immediately above.  Compare the local “profanity” offense, id. § 28-13 (“If any person shall 
use obscene, vulgar, profane, lewd, lascivious or indecent language, or make any suggestion 
or proposal of an obscene nature, or threaten any illegal or immoral act with the intent to 
coerce, intimidate or harass any person, over any telephone in this city, such person shall be 
guilty of a misdemeanor.”), with the state law profanity offense, VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-427 
(2020) (“Any person who uses obscene, vulgar, profane, lewd, lascivious, or indecent 
language, or makes any suggestion or proposal of an obscene nature, or threatens any illegal 
or immoral act with the intent to coerce, intimidate, or harass any person, over any telephone 
or citizens band radio, in this Commonwealth, is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.”). 
 123. See infra notes 162–65 and accompanying text. 
 124. NEWPORT NEWS, VA., CODE § 28-5(a) (“If any person beyond the seventh grade of 
school or over twelve (12) years of age shall engage in the activity commonly known as ‘trick 
or treat’ or any other activity of similar character or nature under any name whatsoever, such 
person shall be guilty of a Class 4 misdemeanor.  Nothing herein shall be construed as 
prohibiting any parent, guardian or other responsible person having lawfully in his custody a 
child twelve (12) years old or younger, from accompanying such child who is playing ‘trick 
or treat’ for the purpose of caring for, looking after or protecting such child.  However, no 
accompanying parent or guardian shall wear a mask of any type.”). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. § 28-41 (“It shall be unlawful and a Class 4 misdemeanor for any person to 
intentionally, and without good cause, direct the beam from a laser pen, flashlight or similar 
device into the eyes (or eye) of another person.”). 
 127. “No owner, tenant or occupant of any plot of land, lot, street, highway, right-of-way 
or any other public or private place shall cause, allow or permit ragweed or poison ivy to grow 
or exist thereon.” CAMDEN, N.J., CODE § 232-2 (2019). 
 128. “No person engaged or employed in the business of a masseur or masseuse shall treat 
a person of the opposite sex.” Id. § 496-2. 
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ad hoc method is how both New York City and Los Angeles “organize” (if it 
can be called that) their local crimes.129 
The final organizational trend to note is the use of a “general penalty” 
provision that applies to violations of an ordinance when a penalty is not 
mentioned in a specific provision.130  This often provides for a punishment 
of up to a few months imprisonment as well as probation.131  General 
penalties may be the source of the largest category of local crimes.  Consider 
the general penalty’s application in the city of Perry, Florida (population 
7017).132  An ordinance prohibits “mark[ing], defac[ing], [or] disfigur[ing]” 
property in a public park in the chapter entitled “Parks and Recreation Areas” 
but provides for no sanction.133  Despite placing this rule outside of the 
separate “Offenses and Miscellaneous Provisions” chapter, the rule is 
nevertheless criminally enforced because of the general penalty provision 
announced at the beginning of the code:  “[W]here no specific penalty is 
provided therefor[e], the violation of any provision of this Code shall be 
punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500.00) or 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding sixty (60) days or by both such fine 
and imprisonment.”134 
These code organization trends are worth noting, but they are not the 
central object of this study.  The next section will do a deeper analysis of the 
text of the individual offenses—whether they be found in an “offenses” 
chapter or are placed ad hoc in the local code or whether they become 
criminal in nature by way of a general penalty. 
2.  The Form of Specific Offenses 
The most interesting thing that one notices when one analyzes a large 
number of local criminal offenses is that they are usually drafted in the 
 
 129. See generally L.A., CAL., CODE (1987); N.Y.C., N.Y., CODE (2020). 
 130. See, e.g., WYOMING, MINN., CODE § 1-13 (2020) (general penalty of up to ninety days 
imprisonment); CAMDEN, N.J., CODE § 1-15 (same). 
 131. MERIDEN, CONN., CODE § 1-4 (2019); PERRY, FLA., CODE § 1-9 (2019); WYOMING, 
MINN., CODE § 1-13; BOWLING GREEN, MO., CODE § 100.220 (2020); GREENFIELD, MO., CODE 
§ 100.220 (2020); FOREST CITY, N.C., CODE § 1-13 (2019); CAMDEN, N.J., CODE § 1-15 
VINELAND, N.J., CODE § 1-15 (2020). 
 132. Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for Incorporated Places in Florida:  
April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-
series/demo/popest/2010s-total-cities-and-towns.html [https://perma.cc/Z5RJ-V7TF] (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2020). 
 133. See PERRY, FLA., CODE § 19-52. 
 134. Id. § 1-9.  As another example, in just the last year, the city of Wyoming, Minnesota, 
created a criminal offense by including a statutory chapter entitled “SEXUAL OFFENDERS AND 
SEXUAL PREDATORS,” WYOMING, MINN., CODE ch. 16, div. 6, which prohibits, among other 
things, registered sex offenders from “participat[ing] in a holiday event involving children 
under eighteen (18) years of age, such as distributing candy or other items to children on 
Halloween, wearing a Santa Claus costume on or preceding Christmas, or wearing an Easter 
Bunny costume on or preceding Easter.” Id. § 16-112.  The chapter includes no instruction on 
the specified penalty, so the general penalty (up to ninety days imprisonment) applies by 
default:  “fine of up to $1,000.00 or imprisonment for not more than 90 days or by both such 
fine and imprisonment.” Id. § 1-13. 
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archaic manner.  The use of precise and detailed offense elements with 
corresponding mental elements is frequently eschewed, and very often a 
mental element is entirely absent.  In other words, clarity and culpability are 
often lacking—especially culpability.  A common form of a local offense is:  
“no person shall θ” (θ meaning some given conduct).  A helpful label for this 
offense form is a “strict liability command.” 
The most significant observation that must be conveyed is the widespread 
absence of mental elements in local criminal offenses—in other words, a 
general disregard for the requirement of culpability.  As Brown describes, 
“the effect of mens rea requirements for each offense element provides its 
normative appeal:  the degree of liability and punishment will be 
proportionate to culpability and limited by it.”135  A culpability requirement 
“ensures that one is punished only for choices one has made, not for events 
one did not will or anticipate.”136  Nevertheless, local criminal law seems to 
very frequently dispense with mens rea.  Consider these offenses from the 
standpoint of the culpability they require (or not), first from two large urban 
jurisdictions, and then from some lesser-known localities.  All impose “strict 
liability”: 
   
 
 135. Brown, supra note 12, at 291. 
 136. Id. at 292. 
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Table 7:  Large Urban Jurisdictions 
New York City 
“Subway 
gratings; 
sweeping into” 
“It shall be unlawful for any person to sweep any 
substance from a sidewalk or other place into a grating 
used for purposes of ventilating any subway 
railroad.”137 
“Unauthorized 
operation of a 
recording 
device in a 
place of public 
performance 
prohibited” 
“No person may engage in or cause or permit another to 
engage in the unauthorized operation of a recording 
device in a place of public performance.”138 
“Destruction 
or removal of 
property in 
buildings or 
structures” 
“No person other than the owner of a building or 
structure, the duly authorized agent of such owner, or an 
appropriate legal authority shall destroy or remove any 
part of such building or structure.”139 
“Bathing in 
public” 
“It shall be unlawful for any person to swim or bathe in 
any of the waters within the jurisdiction of the city, 
except in public or private bathing houses, unless 
covered with a bathing suit so as to prevent any 
indecent exposure of the person; and it shall be 
unlawful for any person to dress or undress in any place 
exposed to view.”140 
   
 
 137. N.Y.C., N.Y., CODE § 19-173 (2019). 
 138. Id. § 10-702. 
 139. Id. § 10-118. 
 140. Id. § 10-123. 
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Los Angeles 
“Silly String—
Hollywood 
Division 
During 
Halloween” 
“No person . . . shall possess, use, sell or distribute Silly 
String at, within or upon any public or private property 
that is either within public view or accessible to the 
public, including, but not limited to, public or private 
streets, sidewalks, parking lots, commercial or 
residential buildings, places of business, or parks within 
the Hollywood Division during Halloween.”141 
“Injury to 
Public 
Property” 
“No person shall cut, break, destroy, remove, deface, 
tamper with, mar, injure, disfigure, interfere with, 
damage, tear, remove, change or alter any:  (a) part of 
any building belonging to this City; (b) drinking 
fountain situated on any public street or sidewalk or any 
appliance used in or about such foundation . . . .”142 
“Urinating or 
Defecating in 
Public” 
“No person shall urinate or defecate in or upon any 
public street, sidewalk, alley, plaza, beach, park, public 
building or other publicly maintained facility or place, 
or in any place open to the public or exposed to the 
public view, except when using a urinal, toilet or 
commode located in a restroom, or when using a 
portable or temporary toilet or other facility designed 
for the sanitary disposal of human waste and which is 
enclosed from public view.”143 
“Animals at 
Large” 
“A person who owns or is in charge of or controls or 
who possesses a dog or other animal who permits, 
allows or causes the dog or other animal to run, stray, 
be uncontrolled or in any manner be in, upon, or at large 
upon a public street, sidewalk, park or other public 
property or in or upon the premises of private property 
of another person is guilty of a misdemeanor if said dog 
or other animal bites or causes injury to any human 
being or other animal.”144 
   
 
 141. LOS ANGELES, CAL., CODE § 56.02 (1987). 
 142. Id. § 41.14. 
 143. Id. § 41.47.2. 
 144. Id. § 53.34. 
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Table 8:  Lesser Known Localities 
Harnett 
County, 
North 
Carolina 
“Firearm 
Restrictions” 
“It shall be unlawful for any person to 
discharge a firearm:  (A) On a parcel of 
property that contains 10,000 square feet 
or less in overall dimension . . . .”145 
Waseca 
County, 
Minnesota 
“Identification 
of Each Unit” 
“The entrance door to every efficiency or 
rooming unit in any lodging 
establishment shall be plainly marked on 
the outside, either numerically or 
alphabetically. No two units may be 
assigned the same number or letter.”146 
Wyoming, 
Minnesota 
“Curfew . . . 
Established” 
“It shall be unlawful for any minor of the 
age 15 years or 16 years to loiter, idle or 
be in or upon the public streets, 
highways, parks, playgrounds or other 
public grounds, public places, places of 
entertainment, or refreshment or any 
other unsupervised place within this city 
between the hours of 11:00 p.m. on any 
day and 5:00 a.m. the following day.”147 
Vineland, 
New Jersey 
“Consumption 
in Public 
Prohibited” 
“It shall be unlawful for any person to 
consume or offer to another for 
consumption any alcoholic beverage in 
or upon any public street, road, alley, 
sidewalk, railroad right-of-way, parking 
lot which is generally open to the public, 
park, shopping plaza or upon any outdoor 
facility owned or operated by the City of 
Vineland.”148
Camden, 
New Jersey 
“Owner and 
occupants not 
to permit 
growth” 
“No owner, tenant or occupant of any 
plot of land, lot, street, highway, right-of-
way or any other public or private place 
shall cause, allow or permit ragweed or 
poison ivy to grow or exist thereon.”149 
Newport 
News, 
Virginia 
“Urination or 
defecation in 
public” 
“It shall be unlawful for any person to 
urinate or defecate in public or in a place 
open to public view except in public 
restroom facilities.”150
 
 145. HARNETT COUNTY, N.C., CODE § 130.09 (2019). 
 146. Waseca County, Minn., Lodging Ordinance 100 § 12.19 (May 18, 2010), repealed by 
Waseca County, Minn., Lodging Ordinance 132 § 9 (June 18, 2019). 
 147. WYOMING, MINN., CODE § 22-36 (2020). 
 148. VINELAND, N.J., CODE § 216-32 (2020). 
 149. CAMDEN, N.J., CODE § 159-2 (2019). 
 150. NEWPORT NEWS, VA., CODE § 28-43 (2020). 
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King 
William 
County, 
Virginia 
“Carnivals” 
“Any person engaged in the operation of 
a carnival or circus show shall pay a 
license tax of $1,000.00 per 
performance.”151
Perry, 
Florida 
“Poles, 
attaching 
posters, etc.” 
 
“It shall be unlawful to attach posters or 
handbills to any telegraph, telephone, 
light, signal or other pole or gas post 
standing in the street or right-of-way.”152 
St. John’s 
County, 
Florida 
“Prohibited 
Presence, 
Loitering or 
Prowling at 
Certain 
Locations”
“It is prohibited for a Sex Offender to be 
on or within a Safety zone of a St. Johns 
County park and recreation center, 
school, daycare center, arcade, school 
bus stop [sic] when children are 
present . . . .”153
Meriden, 
Connecticut 
“Use of bells 
and sirens” 
“No bell or siren on such ambulance shall 
be rung, sounded or blown except in case 
of extreme emergency when responding 
to a call or transporting a patient to a 
hospital, clinic or doctor’s office.”154 
 
This is the most striking observation one encounters when one reads local 
criminal offenses:  the general disregard for the culpability requirement, and 
the proliferation of strict liability.  As mentioned before, this is a hallmark of 
the archaic offense-drafting form.155 
Another way of demonstrating this archaic trend is to look at the codes in 
two Missouri localities mentioned earlier that adopted many state 
misdemeanors but also created their own:  Bowling Green and Greenfield.156  
The contrast between the local and state offenses is illuminating.  Here, the 
state law “copycat” offenses were written with mens rea elements in the 
modern form, but many local inventions—even the newer ones—were 
written without these elements.  Both codes read much more like a 
comprehensive and modern criminal code, and both referenced a state law 
passed in 1997 that empowered localities to “provide for the compilation or 
revision and codification of the general ordinances of the municipality.”157  
It appears that a local code reform movement followed the passage of this 
law.  Bowling Green, Missouri (population 5334158) compiled its ordinances 
 
 151. KING WILLIAM COUNTY, VA., CODE § 18-112 (2018). 
 152. PERRY, FLA., CODE § 18-4 (2019). 
 153. St. John’s County, Fla., Ordinance 2009-36 § 4 (Sept. 1, 2009). 
 154. MERIDEN, CONN., CODE § 62-9 (2019). 
 155. See supra Part I. 
 156. See supra note 121. 
 157. MO. REV. STAT. § 71.943 (2005). 
 158. Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for Incorporated Places in Missouri:  
April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU [hereinafter Annual Population Estimates, 
Missouri], https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/2010s-total-cities-
and-towns.html [https://perma.cc/S8MP-RLY4] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). 
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into a code in 2010,159 while Greenfield, Missouri (population 1371160), did 
the same in 2007.161  Both have criminal offenses that were remarkably more 
sophisticated in their composition than were most of the other localities’ 
offenses.  Consider the language of the “false imprisonment” offense created 
by Greenfield, which is identical (except in label) to the “kidnapping” offense 
created by Bowling Green: 
A person commits the offense of false imprisonment if he/she knowingly 
restrains another unlawfully and without consent so as to interfere 
substantially with his/her liberty.162 
This is written in the modern form.  It also appears that this language was 
directly copied from the state’s “Kidnapping, third degree” offense.163 
But Bowling Green and Greenfield did not always copy from the state.  In 
Greenfield, local officials criminalized owning more than three dogs or cats 
(kittens and puppies excepted) but wrote the offense in this way: 
No person shall at any time keep, harbor or own at one (1) location within 
the City more than a total of three (3) dogs and/or cats over the age of six 
(6) months.164 
This statute is written with clarity but omits a mental element (culpability).  
Now consider one of Bowling Green’s local inventions—the offense of 
abandoning a vehicle: 
No person shall abandon any motor vehicle on the right-of-way of any 
public road or State highway or on any private real property owned by 
another without his consent.165 
Again, clear offense elements are discernable but not a mental element. 
These Missouri localities demonstrate a pattern observed in many codes:  
in general, when a locality innovates and creates a criminal offense where 
there is no state law model, a mental element is left out.  While exceptions 
can be found, these are rare.  Strict liability—a telltale aspect of archaic 
offense drafting—seems to be the default when localities invent their own 
offenses and deviate from state law models. 
IV.  HARMFUL STATE-LOCAL ASYMMETRY 
As we have seen, a comparison of offense-drafting practices in state-level 
jurisdictions and those of many localities broke down into two discernable 
types:  jurisdictions that generally drafted their offenses in the modern form 
 
 159. Bowling Green, Mo., Ordinance 1646 (Jan. 4, 2010). 
 160. Annual Population Estimates, Missouri, supra note 158. 
 161. Greenfield, Mo., Ordinance 3-2007 (Sept. 4, 2007). 
 162. GREENFIELD, MO., CODE § 210.040 (2020); see also BOWLING GREEN, MO., CODE 
§ 215.170 (2020). 
 163. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.130 (2017) (“Kidnapping, third degree, penalty. . . .  A person 
commits the offense of kidnapping in the third degree if he or she knowingly restrains another 
unlawfully and without consent so as to interfere substantially with his or her liberty.”). 
 164. GREENFIELD, MO., CODE § 205.110. 
 165. BOWLING GREEN, MO., CODE § 225.020. 
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and jurisdictions that generally drafted offenses in the archaic form.166  Key 
to the modern-archaic distinction was the presence of clear culpability 
requirements in modern offenses; these requirements enable the interpretive 
practice of element analysis, thereby constraining an adjudicator’s 
determination of liability and preventing the attribution of liability for wholly 
innocent conduct.  A slim majority of state-level jurisdictions (twenty-seven) 
have modern drafting practices, yet the majority of the localities surveyed 
engaged in archaic offense drafting.167  Strict liability offenses proliferate at 
the local level, with local criminal law often appearing as a command to the 
citizens not to engage in certain conduct. 
Since archaic offense drafting exists at the state level, the discovery of its 
replica at the local level is uninteresting as a discovery of some new 
phenomenon.  The significance of archaic local offenses, rather, is that they 
can exist in the larger context of a state that has a modern criminal code.  The 
significance is not the drafting practice, but the mismatch of the practice with 
the superior jurisdiction’s practice.  This mismatch can be called “harmful 
asymmetry,” the implications of which will be discussed below in Part IV.A.   
A.  Description and Implications 
The most important phenomenon I highlight is this:  a mismatch between 
local offenses drafted in the archaic form and state offenses drafted in the 
modern form.168  This harmful asymmetry results when the home rule powers 
of the locality have been used to undermine the drafting advances made in 
the criminal law in the larger jurisdiction.  In cases of harmful asymmetry, 
localities effectively become additional engines of code “degradation” 
already taking place at the state level.  To use Robinson and Cahill’s 
metaphor, localities drastically increase the number of “barnacles” on the 
“hull” of the ship.169 
Consider the example of Kansas.  Kansas has engaged in extensive 
modernization of its criminal code, updating it comprehensively in 1970 and 
again in 2011 after reports and recommendations by an expert 
commission.170  Reviewing Kansas’s code in 2020, one is struck by the 
 
 166. See supra Part III. 
 167. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 168. While one can imagine the inverse—a “beneficial asymmetry,” in which the locality 
drafts modern offenses while the state retains archaic offenses—I have found no examples of 
this phenomenon and therefore table a consideration of its implications for a later day. 
 169. Robinson & Cahill, Model Penal Code Second, supra note 74, at 172. 
 170. 2 JOHN W. WHITE & BRETT WATSON, KAN. CRIM. CODE RECODIFICATION COMM’N, 
2010 FINAL REPORT TO THE KANSAS LEGISLATURE 4 (2009), https:// 
www.kansasjudicialcouncil.org/sites/default/files/2010%20Criminal%20Recodification%20
Final%20Report%20Vol%202_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9L3N-3MXP] (“The Kansas Criminal 
Code Recodification Commission has completed its assigned task to recodify the Kansas 
criminal code and in this final report to the 2010 legislature submits its proposed criminal 
code. . . .  In K.S.A. 21-4801 the 2007 legislature created the Kansas Criminal Code 
Recodification Commission and provided the Commission with the mission and directive to 
recodify the Kansas criminal code.  The Commission is composed of sixteen members 
appointed by the legislative, executive and judicial branches.  The Commission members 
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scrupulous adherence to MPC principles of clear drafting and element 
analysis.   Kansas also has imperio home rule, though, rendering localities 
constitutionally immune from state interference so long as their legislation 
relates to local affairs.171 
If we zoom in to look at the code of one of Kansas’s cities, we see a 
different picture.  Consider Dodge City (population 27,340172).  Dodge City’s 
Code of Ordinances appears extensive, with sixteen chapters that range in 
content from zoning regulations to building codes.173  Some chapters that 
appear to be civil-regulatory chapters are, on closer inspection, criminal 
chapters, including ordinances such as the Historic Resources Preservation 
Ordinance,174 the article governing beekeeping,175 the ordinance governing 
pit bull ownership,176 business regulations,177 the noise ordinance,178 and 
others.179  Moreover, the code also has a “General Penalty” provision 
authorizing a fine of up to $499 or 179 days imprisonment for offenses that 
do not carry a specific penalty.180  But if we turn to Chapter XI—Public 
Offenses—we find what the city appears to intentionally view as criminal 
offenses.181  First, one notices that Dodge City incorporates by reference the 
“Uniform Public Offense Code” promulgated by the League of Kansas 
Municipalities.182  The Uniform Code is 165 pages long and is constantly 
updated by the league.183  It is drafted in the modern form and makes explicit 
references to analogous state statutes.184  Dodge City does not end its own 
public offense code with the article adopting the Uniform Code, though.  It 
continues for six more articles, creating a large number of new criminal 
offenses.185  Immediately after reading the modern Uniform Code, one is 
surprised to see a very different form of offense drafting in the next section: 
 
represent a broad spectrum of experience and interest in the criminal law. . . .  The present 
criminal law of Kansas consists basically of statutes enacted by the 1969 Legislature made 
effective July 1, 1970.”). 
 171. Rodriguez & Baker, supra note 98, at 1393. 
 172. Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for Incorporated Places in Kansas:  
April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-
series/demo/popest/2010s-total-cities-and-towns.html [https://perma.cc/UZ74-6QGQ] (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2020). 
 173. See generally DODGE CITY, KAN., CODE (2019). 
 174. Id. § 1-703. 
 175. Id. § 2-304. 
 176. Id. § 2-409. 
 177. Id. § 5-220. 
 178. Id. § 8-405. 
 179. E.g., id. § 15-407(h)(3) (water emergency rules). 
 180. Id. § 1-116. 
 181. Id. § 11-101.  I say this because of the attempt to include them in one chapter and the 
use of the word “offense.” 
 182. Id. 
 183. UNIF. PUB. OFFENSE CODE FOR KAN. CITIES (LEAGUE OF KAN. MUNS. 2019), 
https://www.dodgecity.org/DocumentCenter/View/1128/UPOC?bidId= [https://perma.cc/ 
L747-XSMC]. 
 184. Id. § 3.1 (“(a) Battery is:  (1) Knowingly or recklessly causing bodily harm to another 
person; or (2) Knowingly causing physical contact with another person when done in a rude, 
insulting or angry manner.  (b) Battery is a Class B violation. (K.S.A. 21-5413).”). 
 185. DODGE CITY, KAN., CODE ch. XI, arts. 2–7. 
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OBSTRUCTING GUTTERS.  It shall be unlawful for any person to place 
any obstruction in any gutter or culvert, or do any act to prevent the flow 
of water through any gutter, drain or culvert in the city.186 
When innovating in the “Local Regulations” article, the city drops mens rea 
almost entirely.187  Another offense in this article reads, “URINATION; 
DEFECATION.  (a) Urination and defecation at, in, within or upon any 
public place in the city is hereby prohibited.”188  Other offenses after the 
Local Regulations are drafted with mental elements—including narcotics, 
public nudity, and juvenile curfew offenses—but one offense is not (walking 
on the road).189 
The case of Dodge City, Kansas, is illustrative.  Not only does the locality 
resist the wholesale adoption of the modern drafting practices of the state 
code, it also fails to learn from the lessons imparted by the model code 
promulgated by the League of Kansas Municipalities.190  While its provisions 
are adopted, they are done so uncritically; when the locality innovates on its 
own, the resultant offenses look completely different from those in the model.  
Harmful asymmetry exists in Dodge City and in an unknown, but potentially 
vast, number of other localities.191 
Here, and in these other jurisdictions, home rule powers have had the effect 
of turning back the clock on the advances in criminal offense drafting.  In 
these localities, the substantive criminal law does little, if anything, to 
prevent certain negative pathologies that the state criminal code was 
rewritten to fix.  With no clear culpability requirements, the proliferation of 
local strict liability commands broadens criminal liability to the point that all 
violations of the ordinances cannot possibly be meant to be punished.  For 
example, the Dodge City urination offense192 would cover an incontinent 
elderly person being wheeled through a park.  But since no prosecutor or 
police officer would ever enforce the ordinances in these cases, the 
overbreadth built into the offense by the local legislature works (whether 
deliberately or not) as a delegation of lawmaking authority to law 
enforcement.  William Stuntz describes this well: 
Because criminal law is broad, prosecutors cannot possibly enforce the law 
as written:  there are too many violators.  Broad criminal law thus means 
that the law as enforced will differ from the law on the books.  And the 
former will be defined by law enforcers, by prosecutors’ decisions to 
prosecute and police decisions to arrest.193 
 
 186. Id. § 11-201. 
 187. It only appears in an offense regarding the sale of spray paint to minors. Id. § 11-
210(b). 
 188. Id. § 11-206. 
 189. Id. ch. XI, arts. 4–6; id. § 11-701. 
 190. Id. § 11-101. 
 191. The previous discussion of the drafting quality in the codes of Bowling Green and 
Greenfield, Missouri provides another example of harmful asymmetry. See supra notes 156–
65. 
 192. See supra note 188. 
 193. Stuntz, supra note 24, at 519. 
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Without offense-drafting practices that maximize the potential of criminal 
law to constrain officials at the adjudication stage—most especially the 
absence of a culpability requirement—the result is executive lawmaking (at 
its best) and potentially arbitrary and discriminatory use of that discretion (at 
its worst).194  Discretion that is constrained at the state level is set free at the 
local level—perhaps the place where it should be most constrained, given 
that objectivity of the enforcement authority may be diminished in a smaller 
jurisdiction.  As we will see in Part V, the proliferation of misdemeanors that 
are easily proved (especially strict liability misdemeanors) also has other 
very concrete and deleterious effects on citizens’ lives, even when the 
maximum punishment is very light. 
B.  Two Causal Hypotheses 
While this Article is concerned mostly with the effects of harmful 
asymmetry and does not purport to offer an explanation of its causes, two 
causal hypotheses are worth considering (I will not attempt to prove or 
disprove either here).  Such consideration may help to elucidate further the 
harmfulness described above.  These causal hypotheses are (1) the reduced 
institutional competence of local governments, or (2) the deliberate 
broadening of liability and a resultant delegation of enforcement decisions to 
prosecutors and police.  Of course, these are alternative hypotheses and 
cannot be simultaneously true.  Ignorance and intentionality are in conceptual 
tension.  Either, though, might explain archaic offense drafting in states with 
modern criminal codes. 
1.  Hypothesis One:  Reduced Institutional Competence 
First, consider the possibility that local lawmaking boards and councils 
simply do not understand how to write criminal offenses with precise 
culpability requirements that facilitate element analysis by an adjudicator.  
Perhaps they do not understand that in the inclusion of their general penalty 
provisions, or the inclusion of a criminal sanction at the end of a substantive 
chapter of codes, they are really creating criminal laws just like the criminal 
laws in a state penal code.  And even if they did understand, they did not 
realize that these kinds of laws are normally written very differently from the 
way you would write rules for, say, the local pool or the local park.  While 
“you shall not X” seems to make intuitive sense to a nonlawyer aiming to 
prohibit certain activity, it is a bad way to write a criminal offense.  Recalling 
Brown’s description of the first “ambition” of the MPC, we can see how 
reduced competence with respect to offense drafting undermines this goal:  
to “bring analytical clarity to the definition and interpretation of criminal 
statutes” that had suffered from a “tradition of poor drafting.”195 
 
 194. Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1759–60 (2006) 
(“Scholars have long pointed out that law enforcement discretion is so broad, unregulated, and 
opaque that it weakens many precepts of rule of law and democratic accountability.”). 
 195. Brown, supra note 12, at 287. 
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There is some reason to support the claim that many of the local offenses 
drafted in the archaic form are drafted in this way because of local ignorance.  
First, consider the competence issues intrinsic to the vast majority of 
lawmaking bodies in localities.  The most significant problem is the most 
obvious one:  localities will usually be small in population and will therefore 
have fewer legislators who are likely to be trained in even the most basic 
understanding of criminal law.  Data from the U.S. Census Bureau in 2017 
indicates that of the approximately 39,000 localities,196 28,682 towns and 
cities have populations less than 5000 people,197 and 687 counties have 
populations less than 10,000 people.198  Most of local criminal law (about 75 
percent), then, is made by comparatively small communities who may or may 
not have a lawyer as a resident—let alone a lawyer as a legislator.  As James 
Madison observed in Federalist No. 10, “the proportion of fit characters be 
not less in the large than in the small republic” and therefore in a larger polity 
there is “a greater probability of a fit choice.”199 
The smaller population of localities, moreover, also results in smaller 
budgets and a reduced ability to fund a staff to advise the local board on 
ordinances it seeks to create.  We do not expect members of Congress or state 
legislatures to understand the technical aspects of criminal offense drafting, 
but we do expect them to have lawyers on staff who can advise them on it.  
This is largely lacking in the vast majority of low-population, and therefore 
low-budget, localities.  A common model appears to be that the “town” or 
“city” attorney is a private attorney with a separate practice, and the 
municipality acts as but one of the different “clients” of the attorney.  
Meriden, Connecticut, some of whose offenses are mentioned above, lists 
three attorneys as its “legal department,”200 but all three of them appear to 
have outside practices that are their full-time jobs—one is a criminal defense 
lawyer201 and the other two are civil litigators.202  It is unclear whether any 
of these attorneys have any role in advising the city council on legislative 
drafting in the manner of a professional legislative staff.  Meriden, though, 
 
 196. Government Units by State:  Census Years 1942 to 2017, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-governments.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q8DB-4LHH] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). 
 197. Subcounty General-Purpose Governments by Population-Size Group and State, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-governments.html 
[https://perma.cc/5FXH-NAK3] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). 
 198. County Governments by Population-Size Group and State, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-governments.html 
[https://perma.cc/JP3D-FHD4]. 
 199. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 200. City of Meriden, Legal Department, MERIDENCT.GOV, https://www.meridenct.gov/ 
staff/law [https://perma.cc/8FCQ-QL4W] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). 
 201. Michael D. Quinn, MAHON, QUINN & MAHON, P.C., https://www.mqmlawyer.com/ 
attorneys/michael-d-quinn [https://perma.cc/V3YS-X8XC] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). 
 202. Christopher Clark, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/christopher-clark-
bb557969 [https://perma.cc/F4BL-SQY4] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020); Stephanie Dellolio, URY 
& MOSKOW LLC, https://www.urymoskow.com/about/stephanie-dellolio [https://perma.cc/ 
J8GT-HSMB] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). 
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has a population of around 60,000.203  Consider a smaller locality whose 
offenses were discussed earlier:  Greenfield, Missouri (population 1371204).  
Greenfield’s website lists one “city attorney,” who appears to have a solo 
private practice in the city.205  Again, this attorney’s involvement in advising 
the city council on legislative drafting is unknown (although local law 
dictates that the attorney not advise on legislation unless asked!).206 
Another feature that may be at work in creating this competency deficit is 
a feature extrinsic to the local governments:  the lack of outside professional 
groups’ attention to local criminal laws.  Indifference or lack of resources on 
the part of the groups that are competent to assist in drafting offenses or to 
scrutinize existing ones, therefore, compounds the intrinsic competence 
shortfall of the local boards.  By “outside groups” I mean the various 
organizations and institutes in which lawyers associate for the betterment of 
the legal system.  These include, most universally, the bar associations of the 
various jurisdictions.  While state bars are large enough to form commissions 
and committees to study existing and proposed criminal laws, the same is not 
true for most localities.  Of the approximately 75 percent of local 
governments covering populations of less than 5000, there may be only a 
single attorney in each—or none.  Returning to Greenfield, Missouri, an 
internet search reveals only four active attorneys.207  These jurisdictions will 
not have bar associations. 
Beyond the practicing bar, legal academia has, of course, an important role 
in monitoring and commenting on the development of criminal codes.  Most 
localities, though, are unlikely to have a local law school; if they do, the 
criminal law professor may be the only specialist in the state and is more 
likely to focus on state law.  Academia seems to be poorly suited to the task 
of advising local boards on criminal legislation. 
Nationally, the ALI took the lead in creating an MPC and pointing out the 
problems in many states’ criminal laws.  The ALI is composed of respected 
lawyers, judges, and law professors, all with deep expertise in their respective 
fields.208  But given its scope, the ALI cannot turn its attention to localities.  
 
 203. See Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for Incorporated Places in 
Connecticut:  April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census. 
gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/2010s-total-cities-and-towns.html [https://perma.cc/ 
47UT-LM5J] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). 
 204. Annual Population Estimates, Missouri, supra note 158. 
 205. City Council, GREENFIELD, MO., https://greenfieldmo.org/city-council.php?The-Page-
1 [https://perma.cc/J9LR-4VJF] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). 
 206. GREENFIELD, MO., CODE § 115.280 (2020) (“The City Attorney shall, in addition to 
his/her other duties which are or may be required by this Code or other ordinance, when 
ordered by the Mayor or Board of Aldermen to do so, prosecute or defend all suits and actions 
originating or pending in any court of this State to which the City is a party or in which the 
City is interested . . . .  The City Attorney shall give his/her opinion to City Officials only after 
being so requested by the Board of Aldermen.”). 
 207. The Official Missouri Directory of Lawyers, THE MO. BAR, https://mobar.org/ 
site/content/For-the-Public/Lawyer_Directory.aspx [https://perma.cc/2PN7-AARC] (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2020) (type “Greenfield” in “City Contains” field and select “Find”). 
 208. See Membership, AM. L. INST., https://www.ali.org/members/ [https://perma.cc/ 
GR4B-RAUV] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020) (“Our membership consists of eminent judges, 
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All of the traditional outside groups that assist in the creation and 
monitoring209 of criminal offenses are of no avail to the vast majority of 
localities. 
2.  Hypothesis Two:  Deliberate Overdeterrence 
While competency issues due to low population and reduced legal 
expertise likely account for many local offenses written in the archaic form, 
this cannot explain similar offenses in large city codes or where there is 
evidence of careful and deliberate offense drafting that nevertheless rejects 
modern drafting paradigms.  With these offenses, an alternative hypothesis 
to consider is that the city council intends to overdeter, and hopes that law 
enforcement authorities will wisely exercise their discretion to avoid 
punishing outlier cases.  As discussed above, this form of overbreadth in the 
archaic offense-drafting form usually means that the offense omits any 
mention of a mental element.210  If use of strict liability is intentional, then 
what Brown calls the “second ambition” of the MPC is similarly undermined:  
the “substantive” goal of “a criminal law committed to a pervasive 
requirement of subjective culpability with respect to every significant 
element of every offense.”211 
Samuel Buell describes this possible explanation of intentional 
overbreadth well:  “[A]nnouncing that sanctions may apply not only to 
undesirable behaviors but also to behaviors akin or proximate to undesirable 
ones pushes actors back from the boundaries of the law . . . .”212  The idea is 
that “lawmakers mean to overdeter.”213  Buell cites Dan Kahan, arguing that 
“a ‘prudence of obfuscation’ . . . is designed to induce uncertainty and 
restraint among persons who seek to pursue undesirable behaviors within the 
literal terms of legal rules.”214  I would add to this that the obfuscation 
intended against the bad actors may often be coupled with a presumption of 
the enforcement authorities’ wise discretion to ameliorate unjust application 
of the literal offense in outlier cases.  Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III channels 
this argument, writing, “[b]ecause elected officials recognize that inflexible 
 
lawyers, and law professors . . . selected on the basis of professional achievement and 
demonstrated interest in improving the law.”). 
 209. A bit more should be said about the special role such groups can play in the period 
after an offense is created—what I call the “monitoring role.”  When a locality adopts state 
offenses as its own, this obviates the drafting issues discussed above but creates other 
problems of desuetude.  For example, Newport News, Virginia, has copied—and retains—the 
offense of “cohabitation” directly from the state code, but this offense was later repealed at 
the state level in 2013. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-345 (repealed Mar. 30, 2013); NEWPORT NEWS, 
VA., CODE § 28-16 (2020).  Without the resources and attention of outside expert groups to 
monitor a code of offenses, even initial reliance by a locality on the model statutes of the state 
can, through time, result in strange relics remaining on the books. 
 210. See supra Part II.B. 
 211. Brown, supra note 12, at 287–88. 
 212. Buell, supra note 26, at 1501. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. (citing Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse—but Only for the Virtuous, 
96 MICH. L. REV. 127,129 (1997)). 
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rules can lead to unjust results and an unwise allocation of prosecutorial time 
and energy, these officials properly delegate substantial enforcement 
discretion to prosecutors and other actors.”215 
The case of a Dayton, Ohio, dog control ordinance illustrates a potential 
example of this phenomenon.  The offense provided that “[n]o person shall 
own, keep, possess, harbor, maintain, or have the care, custody, or control of 
a vicious dog within the city.”216  When a pit bull broke free from its owner 
and subsequently attacked another dog, the owner was charged with a 
violation of the ordinance.217  The owner challenged the offense as invalidly 
imposing strict liability, but this was rejected by a state appellate court.218  
The local legislature wrote in the “Defenses” section to the ordinance that 
“[l]ack of intent or knowledge is not a defense to a violation of this section,” 
and therefore the court held that legislative intent for strict liability was 
manifest.219  Interestingly, the court then went out of its way to take judicial 
notice of the MPC’s prohibition on strict liability for offenses, like the 
Dayton dog ordinance, that carried a potential sentence of incarceration.220  
Clear legislative intent, though, trumped the MPC’s aspirational 
guidelines.221  Moreover, the court ended its discussion by stating that strict 
liability and even incarceration was a rational response by the legislature to 
this social problem:  “While the potential penalty [of six months 
imprisonment] embodied in the vicious dog statute is eminently harsh, when 
viewed against the public safety, these sections are legitimate police power 
enactments.”222  The Dayton ordinance may show an intentional 
overdeterrence by the use of strict liability due to the dangerousness of 
vicious dogs. 
Consider also a similar law recently enacted in my hometown—Cobleskill, 
New York (population 4678223).  The town board created a criminal offense 
prohibiting dogs “Running at Large” and wrote it in the archaic form as a 
strict liability offense: 
Running at Large 
A. It shall be unlawful . . . for any person owning or having charge, care, 
custody or control of any dog to permit such dog to be upon any private 
 
 215. Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, In Defense of American Criminal Justice, 67 VAND. L. 
REV. 1099, 1132 (2014). 
 216. City of Dayton v. Dye, No. 9539, 1986 WL 12353, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 30, 1986) 
(quoting DAYTON, OHIO, CODE § 91.50(B) (2004)).  For a later case reapplying Dye to another 
provision of the ordinance, see Ohio v. Thaler, No. 22579, 2008 WL 4684367, at *4–5 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2008). 
 217. Dye, 1986 WL 12353, at *1. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at *2. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for Incorporated Places in New York:  
April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-
series/demo/popest/2010s-total-cities-and-towns.html [https://perma.cc/7Q23-LWF4] (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2020). 
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property without the permission of the occupant of such private 
property . . . .224 
A local news article reporting on the debate over the ordinance is revealing.  
First, the genesis of the offense appears to be a personal experience of the 
town supervisor.225  A dog bit him while he was on a run, he reported this to 
the state police, and the police asked if he had provoked the dog.226  This 
response by the state police, seemingly blaming him for the bite, “bothered” 
him (the New York Penal Code indicates no applicable state offenses relating 
to dogs, and therefore it is likely that the state police had no probable cause 
to address the issue as a criminal matter).227  One citizen at the meeting 
expressed concern that the offense would seem to apply to cases in which his 
dogs went onto his neighbor’s property with the neighbor’s permission.228  
While this would plainly be excluded by the terms of the offense, the town 
supervisor’s response was revealing.  Instead of noting the textual exception 
for the property occupant’s consent, the supervisor reassured the citizen with 
an allusion to selective enforcement:  “Let’s be frank.  This is for people who 
don’t take care of their dogs.”229  Here, an intentionally broad, strict liability 
offense is created to redress a gap in state law (also, because of a legislator’s 
personal experience), and concerns of overbreadth are assuaged by what 
must be an expectation of wise enforcement discretion.  The law on the books 
does not matter; the textual exception for an owner’s consent does not matter.  
The “frank” meaning of the law is the way in which it is expected to be 
applied on the street and that is only against bad people—the people who 
“don’t take care of their dogs.” 
V.  LOCAL OFFENSES AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SCHOLARSHIP:  
MISDEMEANORLAND AND DEMOCRATIZATION 
While the primary aim of this Article is to unearth and analyze the 
phenomenon of harmful asymmetry between state and local criminal law 
drafting practices, a secondary aim is to assess the consequences of this for 
some influential contemporary debates in criminal law scholarship.  Two 
bodies of literature are most implicated:  (1) the newly burgeoning body of 
work addressing the misdemeanor criminal justice system and (2) the 
movement to “democratize” criminal justice.  Scholarship regarding so-
called “misdemeanorland” highlights the impact of low-level offenses on 
citizens’ lives and critiques the system’s departure from the traditional 
 
 224. COBLESKILL, N.Y., CODE § 52-5 (2019). 
 225. Patsy Nicosia, Cobleskill Goes with Dog Law, TIMES-J. (July 10, 2019), 
https://www.timesjournalonline.com/article.asp?id=104550 [https://perma.cc/GR4B-
RAUV]. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id.  This is understandable given New York’s substantial adherence to the MPC (and 
the MPC’s avoidance of public welfare offenses). See supra Part II.A. 
 228. Nicosia, supra note 225 (“Also speaking at Monday’s public hearing, Jerry Coons 
asked if he’d be ticketed or fined if his dogs went on his neighbor’s property with their 
permission.”). 
 229. Id. 
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“adjudicative,” rule-bound criminal justice model concerned with factual 
guilt for blameworthy conduct.  The replacement is a “managerial” model, 
concerned with social control through procedural hurdles, in which officials 
often act lawlessly.230  The democratization movement in criminal justice, 
on the other hand, addresses the problem of racially skewed mass 
incarceration and blames the current system’s bureaucratic approach that 
prioritizes expertise and efficiency over just outcomes that accord with 
community moral views.231  The antidote to bureaucratization, these scholars 
claim, is democratization—a reorientation toward lay values. 
Harmful asymmetry caused by archaically drafted local criminal law is 
relevant to both scholarly conversations.  For misdemeanorland, harmful 
asymmetry can be seen as compounding the problem of lawlessness by 
creating poorly written law; it is bad enough when officials ignore the 
existence of an offense element, but it is arguably worse when an element 
that serves an important limiting function is absent textually.  For 
democratization, the phenomenon of harmful asymmetry pushes back against 
the attack on expertise and the defense of lay values.  At the level of a local 
government—normally a more “democratic” level of government—criminal 
law is drafted in a manner that ignores modern methods and has harmful 
effects.  Meanwhile, the states, influenced by experts such as the ALI and the 
professoriate, draft offenses in a superior manner. 
A.  Misdemeanorland 
First, consider the burgeoning literature of the last two years that has 
addressed the misdemeanor criminal justice system, led largely by the 
contributions of Alexandra Natapoff and Issa Kohler-Hausmann.232  How is 
the phenomenon of harmful asymmetry relevant here?  Scholars studying the 
misdemeanor system are primarily concerned with the effects of the 
misdemeanor investigation and adjudication process, and therefore, the level 
of government that creates the misdemeanor offense is rarely mentioned.  
However, since in most states, localities can only create misdemeanor-level 
offenses, local criminal law is surely part of the story Natapoff and Kohler-
Hausmann are telling.233 
 
 230. See infra Part V.A. 
 231. See infra Part V.B. 
 232. See Alexandra Natapoff, The High Stakes of Low-Level Criminal Justice, 128 YALE 
L.J. 1648, 1651–52 (2019) (reviewing KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 28, and citing other 
recent scholarship regarding misdemeanors). 
 233. One caveat is worth mentioning, though:  many of the observations noted above have 
limited relevance once one looks outside of large, urban misdemeanor court systems.  Kohler-
Hausmann, for example, studied the misdemeanor system in New York City, while Natapoff 
frequently draws on her experience working in Baltimore. See KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra 
note 28; Natapoff, supra note 30, at 1333–34, 1359.  In a smaller jurisdiction with fewer police 
officers and fewer misdemeanor cases, it may be that “misdemeanorland” more resembles the 
adjudicative model of “felonyland.”  However, in smaller systems, the problems of 
lawlessness may also be exacerbated.  Rural New York, for example, is notorious for 
permitting nonlawyers to sit as local magistrates. See, e.g., William Glaberson, In Tiny Courts 
of N.Y., Abuses of Law and Power, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
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Some background is necessary.  The issues raised by the misdemeanorland 
literature can largely be summed up in the phrase first coined by Malcolm 
Feeley:  “the process is the punishment.”234  In other words, with 
misdemeanor offenses, the real systemic aim of the endeavor is putting the 
defendant through the investigation and adjudication process—not that the 
prescribed sentence be meted out after an authoritative determination of guilt.  
In the case of a large urban misdemeanor court system, such as New York 
City, Kohler-Hausmann identified a system that had a goal of establishing a 
“managerial model” of “social control”—not an “adjudicative” model, like 
with felonies, which focused on determining guilt and an appropriate 
sentence.235  Natapoff emphasizes an even more sinister goal of the system—
revenue generation by payment of fees and fines—as well as the more 
mundane use of misdemeanors as a measure of police “productivity.”236 
While the unstated goals of the misdemeanor system seem foreign to the 
traditional vision of criminal justice, so too do other aspects of the process.  
Most significant are Natapoff’s observations that the system often acts in a 
lawless manner without concern for the requirement of evidence of guilt.237  
With respect to lawlessness, she notes a “cultural disregard for the rule of 
law” in a system that “quietly tolerat[es] abuses of power by unaccountable 
local officials” who simply ignore legal constraints.238  One example she uses 
is a practice of the Baltimore police department to routinely arrest individuals 
for “loitering” despite knowing that the conduct leading to the arrest cannot 
satisfy all the elements of the offense.239  Often, unrepresented defendants 
will plead guilty even if their conduct would not meet the elements, thereby 
avoiding the provocation of the prosecution and the costs of litigation.240 
Since the “process is the punishment” in misdemeanorland, one might 
think that observations about the form of substantive criminal law have little 
 
2006/09/25/nyregion/25courts.html [https://perma.cc/ELQ6-QHP2]; Lauren Rosenthal, How 
Does NY Go About Turning a Regular Person into a Judge?, N. COUNTRY PUB. RADIO (Apr. 
12, 2018), https://www.northcountrypublicradio.org/news/story/35988/2018412/how-does-
ny-go-about-turning-a-regular-person-into-a-judge [https://perma.cc/W6GA-X76R].  The 
availability of legal representation is also undoubtedly diminished in smaller communities.  
One of Natapoff’s claims seems to hold true no matter the jurisdiction:  the excessive use of 
the criminal sanction to address all societal problems, no matter the blameworthiness or 
harmfulness. 
 234. See generally FEELEY, supra note 110. 
 235. The three most significant characteristics of the managerial model were:  (1) its aim 
of “marking” defendants by putting arrests and convictions on their records so that they could 
be tracked and later controlled; (2) putting up “procedure hassles” to test the “rule-abiding 
propensities” of the marked individuals (e.g., appearing in court); and (3) “performance” in 
place of a sentence, meaning “the set of activities the defendant is instructed by the court or 
prosecution to undertake,” such as drug treatment (also aimed at testing rule-abidingness). 
KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 28, at 21. 
 236. NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 9, 17. 
 237. Id. at 191. 
 238. Id. at 206–07. 
 239. Natapoff, supra note 30, at 1359 (discussing that Baltimore police often ignore the 
statutory element of obstructing another person’s movement). 
 240. Id. at 1359–60; see also NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 5 (calling this “meet em and plead 
em”). 
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(or at least greatly diminished) relevance for the study of that system.241  
Moreover, if lawlessness is one of the central features242 of this system, then 
an improvement in the way the laws are written would seem to be a waste of 
time.  However, even if one claims that rampant lawlessness and disregard 
of the substantive criminal law is an endemic feature of the misdemeanor 
system, there is still something worse than lawlessness.  This is de facto 
lawlessness with the technical veneer of lawfulness—textually sanctioned ad 
hoc decision-making by officials.  In such a state of affairs, one cannot even 
appeal to a higher adjudicative body with a claim of lawlessness; substantive 
criminal law that is overly broad and which lacks minimal constraints on 
adjudicators (especially culpability requirements) comes close to this. 
Thus, Natapoff accepts that one aspect of the pathologies of 
misdemeanorland is indeed directly related to offense definition practices: 
[T]he specific content of codes do not meaningfully constrain law 
enforcement, and [] resulting convictions therefore lack the legal 
legitimacy that codified law provides.  Police are not strongly bound by 
codified requirements in loitering, trespassing, and disturbing the peace 
statutes . . . because those statutes cover wide swaths of innocuous 
behavior . . . .243 
Here, she expressly relies on the work of William Stuntz mentioned earlier, 
in which he claims that overly broad offense definitions effectively 
 
 241. One detects that Kohler-Hausmann and Natapoff diverge on this point.  Kohler-
Hausmann, a sociologist as well as a legal scholar, appears more strongly committed to the 
claim that law in general—both substantive and procedural—is a distraction.  As she 
concludes, the “most important lesson” to draw from her study of New York City’s 
misdemeanor system is that “approaches that tinker with legal process, or even substantive 
criminal law reforms, are only capable of reaching a limited set of issues.” Issa Kohler-
Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 618 (2014).  
Both substantive and procedural rules are “simply the tools available in the contested and 
always-underspecified endeavor of social control,” and therefore, the solution must be a 
political decision to rethink the use of criminal law as a mechanism of social control with 
respect to misdemeanor-type conduct. Id. at 653, 692.  In her book that followed the previous 
article, Kohler-Hausmann continues this theme, stating that constitutional prohibitions on 
vague offenses and status offenses “do not in practice seriously constrain the power of the 
police and prosecutors to control people.” KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 28, at 259–60; see 
also Charlie Gerstein & J. J. Prescott, Process Costs and Police Discretion, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
F. 268, 270 (2015) (“[C]riminal law process costs essentially decouple statutory discretion 
from actual police behavior, rendering the debate about statutory language largely moot.”).  
As we will see below, Natapoff believes that substantive criminal law plays more of an 
important role. See infra notes 243–45 and accompanying text. 
 242. In misdemeanorland, Natapoff claims that “legal rules are openly ignored,” as “speed 
and informality are the norm.” NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 191–92.  She uses as examples the 
chief judge of South Carolina openly instructing state magistrates to ignore Sixth Amendment 
law due to lack of “resources,” as well as a New York defendant’s conviction (seven times) 
for violating a loitering offense that had been declared unconstitutional. Id. at 192.  “Such 
lawlessness,” she concludes, is “a key characteristic of the petty-offense process.” Id. 
 243. Natapoff, supra note 30, at 1360.  She does think substantive criminal law can work 
as a limiter:  “By contrast, when codes work properly, statutory constraints have outcome-
determinative force.  For example, and in better keeping with the legality ideal, the statutory 
definition of ‘honest services’ has become an important limitation on the government’s ability 
to use the mail fraud statute to prosecute corruption.” Id. at 1359. 
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“delegate[] power to law enforcement to define how the law is applied in 
practice,” especially in the context of plea bargaining “against [a] backdrop 
of unlimited potential liability.”244  And part of the overbreadth problem, 
Natapoff notes, is “weak culpability requirements.”245 
Now one can begin to see how the form of local criminal law described 
earlier has relevance for the misdemeanor literature.  Archaic local criminal 
law, with its panoply of strict liability offenses, works to add to overbreadth 
and to increase the size of the “menu” of options for prosecutors to use when 
extracting pleas.246  If lawlessness is a problem in misdemeanorland, then 
local criminal misdemeanors compound the problem.  They effectively 
authorize through offense definition what a lawless official would seek to do 
via illegal means.  Police, prosecutors, and judges need not ignore a mental 
element in defiance of the law if it is absent from the ordinance’s text.  In 
that case, they are just playing by the rules. 
B.  Democratization 
The phenomenon of harmful asymmetry between state and local criminal 
offense drafting helps to inform a second scholarly conversation:  the recent 
movement to democratize criminal justice.  In a 2017 symposium held by 
Northwestern University Law Review, nineteen scholars signed on to a white 
paper with recommendations for criminal justice reform to address the 
contemporary crisis of racialized mass incarceration.247  Joshua Kleinfeld, 
writing a “manifesto” for the entire group, draws a contrast between “two 
visions of criminal justice”: 
On one side are those who think the root of the present crisis is the outsized 
influence of the American public—a violent, vengeful, stupid, uninformed, 
racist, indifferent, or otherwise wrongheaded American public—and the 
solution is to place control over criminal justice in the hands of officials 
and experts.  On the other side are those who think the root of the present 
crisis is a set of bureaucratic attitudes, structures, and incentives divorced 
from the American public’s concerns and sense of justice, and the solution 
is to make criminal justice more community focused and responsive to lay 
influences.248 
 
 244. Id. at 1358 (citing Stuntz, supra note 24, at 506). 
 245. Id. at 1359.  She also notes that localities contribute to overcriminalization in general 
(in terms of the punishment of too much conduct). NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 193 (arguing 
that many misdemeanors punish conduct that is not sufficiently “bad, dangerous, or 
blameworthy”). 
 246. William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2548 (2004) (“Most bodies of substantive law define citizens’ 
obligations.  Criminal law is different.  Its primary role is not to define obligations, but to 
create a menu of options for prosecutors.”). 
 247. See generally Kleinfeld et al., supra note 32, at 1693. 
 248. Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 
1367, 1376 (2017). 
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This is the “conflict of visions,” a conflict between “bureaucratic 
professionalization” and “democratization”; the democratizers’ position is 
obviously the latter.249 
The phenomenon unearthed by this Article, harmful asymmetry, 
represents a mismatch between the superior product of a large state 
legislature informed by the expertise of the ALI and the inferior product of a 
smaller local board or council potentially because of incompetence or the 
deliberate overbroadening of criminal law.  If one accepts that localities are 
understood to better capture “lay influences” than states and that archaic 
offense drafting is inferior to modern offense drafting, then the tension with 
Kleinfeld’s statement should be clear:  harmful asymmetry shows that when 
the lay public is left to its own devices, uninformed or unrestrained by expert 
influence, it is either “stupid” and “uninformed” (if archaic local offenses are 
the result of incompetence), or it is “violent” and “vengeful” (if they are the 
result of deliberate overbroadening).250  Harmful asymmetry is evidence in 
favor of the claims about the public that the democratizers reject.  But is it 
true that the democratizers would accept that localities are more democratic 
(or at least better capture lay values) than states?  And would they accept that 
the advances of modern offense drafting are actually an “advance”? 
If we turn back to Kleinfeld’s description of the two camps in his 
manifesto, there is no explicit reference to local governments;251 moreover, 
these entities are largely absent from the discussion of the policy proposals 
that follow.252  However, there are hints throughout the democratization 
volume that a “community-focused” criminal justice system incorporates an 
implicit subsidiarity-type principle that smaller governmental entities are 
preferable.253  Most significant is Kleinfeld’s description of the “democracy” 
that the democratizers aim to maximize.254  This conception of democracy 
 
 249. All nineteen authors at the symposium signed on to a similarly phrased claim:  “[T]he 
root of the crisis is a set of bureaucratic attitudes, structures, and incentives divorced from the 
American public’s concerns and sense of justice, and the solution is to make criminal justice 
more community-focused and responsive to lay influences.” Kleinfeld et al., supra note 32, at 
1694. 
 250. Kleinfeld, supra note 248, at 1376; see also id. at 1397–98 (“[James] Whitman views 
the American public as, above all, violent; [John] Langbein views the American public as, 
above all, stupid; and [David] Garland views the American public as, above all, racist.  Each 
traces the American criminal system’s dysfunctions to the toxic combination of popular rule 
with a bad populace, and each turns to bureaucratic governance as a solution.  They are far 
from alone in this:  versions of their views can be heard in the work of Michelle Alexander, 
Michael Tonry, Nicola Lacey, and many, many others, both scholarly and popular.  The view 
is so often and so casually repeated that it has become the dominant narrative of the criminal 
justice crisis in American intellectual life.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 251. See generally id. 
 252. Notable exceptions are the discussion of prosecutorial elections, civilian review 
boards to control the police, and the size of the jury venire. See generally Kleinfeld et al., 
supra note 32. 
 253. Consider the favorable reference to William Stuntz’s claim that “criminal justice 
should generally be in the hands of local neighborhoods.” Kleinfeld, supra note 248, at 1403 
n.122 (citing Stuntz, supra note 24, at 520–23). 
 254. Id. at 1390. 
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seeks to enhance citizen participation (among other values as well),255 with 
participation, meaning self-government through majoritarian decision-
making.256  Whether or not smaller, local governments will further these aims 
is a central question of political theory that may never be resolved.  Kleinfeld, 
though, suggests that at least the participatory aspect of his theory of 
democracy is enhanced by smaller entities.  He states approvingly that 
“participatory democracy captures core elements of democratic practice . . . 
[including] direct rule in local settings (both governmental and 
nongovernmental).”257 
Consider also Rick Bierschbach’s piece in the same symposium 
volume.258  Like the other democratizers, Bierschbach’s preference for local 
control over criminal law enforcement is explicit,259 as is increased local 
control of adjudication by jury participation.260  Less clear is the place of 
local legislatures and the substantive criminal law they create.  However, 
Bierschbach does mention approvingly that just as localities have the bulk of 
enforcement responsibilities, they also “pass and enforce their own 
codes.”261  Local criminal law, then, appears to be included within his larger 
endorsement of the benefits of a fragmented system: 
The benefits of this structure are not only—or even primarily—in guarding 
against governmental abuse.  They also rest on broadly democratic 
concepts like representativeness, deliberation, and self-determination. . . .  
[F]ragmentation provides multiple nodes of input that allow communities 
and neighborhoods to tailor on-the-ground criminal justice to their unique 
 
 255. Id. at 1390–95 (noting other values, like government responsiveness to lay values over 
those of bureaucratic experts, deliberation (meaning a communicative process by which 
culture is formed), and freedom as nondomination (through the rule of law and 
constitutionalism)). 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. at 1390.  Later he writes that in the democratizers’ democracy, “criminal law and 
procedure . . . is substantially given into the hands of local communities as an instrument of 
collective self-determination and cultural self-creation.” Id. at 1397. 
 258. See generally Richard A. Bierschbach, Fragmentation and Democracy in the 
Constitutional Law of Punishment, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1437 (2017). 
 259. Id. at 1446.  Note the emphasis on enforcement and adjudication.  The legislature is 
not mentioned but police, judges, prosecutors, and jurors are. Id. at 1446–47 (“That 
enforcement apparatus includes thousands of counties and municipalities, several thousand 
prosecutors’ offices employing tens of thousands of prosecutors, and more than twelve 
thousand police departments employing hundreds of thousands of officers.  It also includes 
thousands of local courts, judges, jails and prisons, parole and probation officers, and everyday 
citizens who interact (as jurors or otherwise) with the system on a daily basis.”); see also 
Kleinfeld et al., supra note 32, at 1700 (calling for civilian review boards to “advise police 
departments and liaise between police departments and local communities”); Jocelyn 
Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice Through Contestation and Resistance, 111 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1609, 1612 (2017) (stating that cop-watching is an example of “contestation 
[which] display[s] a faith in local democracy as a tool of responsive criminal justice”). 
 260. Kleinfeld et al., supra note 32, at 1697 (“All juries . . . should be drawn from within 
the immediate, local community in which the crime was committed . . . .”). 
 261. Bierschbach, supra note 258, at 1446. 
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needs and reconcile competing values and priorities in their own 
ways . . . .262 
This defense of localism is a combination of a number of different arguments, 
all of which would appear to justify devolution of control over substantive 
criminal law to smaller and smaller governmental entities.263  Overall, it 
would not be a stretch to posit that the democratizers have, at least in 
principle, a fondness for local criminal law. 
But what about the second assumption:  would democratizers accept that 
modern offense drafting is superior to archaic offense drafting?  I believe the 
answer is a qualified yes.  The yes must be qualified because, while the 
democratizers say little about offense definitions, they explicitly incorporate 
the views of someone who said quite a bit:  William Stuntz.264  In saying that 
Stuntz would have been “one of us,” for example, Kleinfeld cites to one of 
his claims about offense definitions:  “common law mens rea standards, 
because of their moralistic and open-ended character, open up a necessary 
space for nontechnical argumentation about culpability and equity in 
criminal justice trials.”265  Stuntz’s basic point was that the jury should be 
able to consider moral blameworthiness when it considered culpability and 
not simply intentionality with respect to bodily movements and risk 
 
 262. Id.  He calls this the “optimist’s vision” of fragmentation, but one should conclude 
that he himself shares that vision with respect to local criminlizaion.  Later, in the section on 
“Reforms,” Biershbach writes that “[g]reater attention to the values (but not the doctrine) of 
federalism and its close cousin localism could likewise help,” and he explicitly references 
local legislative power. Id. at 1452. 
 263. Here we see a concern for liberty, political participation, and experimentation by 
different jurisdictions.  These arguments are also commonly used to justify federalism. See 
Brenner M. Fissell, Federalism and Constitutional Criminal Law, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 489, 
521 (2017) (listing “generally accepted values of federalism,” as described by the Supreme 
Court and academic commentators, to be “(1) maximization of individual liberty through 
checks on government power (the ‘principal benefit’); (2) experimentation and innovation 
across jurisdictions; (3) responsiveness to geographic diversity; (4) democratic participation; 
(5) competition for citizens; and (6) inherent sovereignty”). 
 264. Kleinfeld, supra note 248, at 1403 (“Missing from this constitutional conversation, a 
founding father of the democratization point of view, is Bill Stuntz.  He would have been 
among us had he lived.”).  This invocation of Stuntz further supports the claim made above 
regarding democratizers’ preference for localism.  Kleinfeld, in citing to Stuntz, approvingly 
notes the latter’s arguments “that criminal justice should generally be in the hands of local 
neighborhoods; that, in particular, prosecutors should be elected from highly local community 
units like neighborhoods rather than from large counties.” Id. at 1403 n.122. 
 265. Id. 
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taking.266  He blamed the efforts of the ALI and its product, the MPC, for a 
regime that foreclosed this consideration.267 
It is not clear how much of this the democratizers would sign on to, and it 
is unfair to impute to them everything Stuntz wrote in his final book about 
mental elements (especially given its contestability).268  One does not find in 
the democratization literature a criticism of the efforts undertaken by the 
MPC drafters or of the use of precise, but thin, conceptions of mental states 
such as intent.  Instead, it appears that the insights of Stuntz are to be applied 
 
 266. In his last book, Stuntz made the novel claim that “[t]he law professors who wrote the 
Model Penal Code helped to replace a system of legal doctrine that worked with one that 
didn’t” and that “[t]he most important change” made by the drafters was a change in the 
conception of mens rea. WILLIAM STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
194, 260 (2011).  In the pre-MPC world, Stuntz argued, mens rea meant “a state of mind that 
was worthy of moral blame.” Id. at 260.  An example of this type of mens rea that is still in 
force, he says, is “depraved heart” murder. Id. at 381 n.30.  A case that, for Stuntz, exemplified 
this halcyon past era is Justice Robert Jackson’s famous opinion in Morissette, where a strict 
liability federal theft statute was interpreted to have an implicit knowledge mens rea with 
respect to the claim of right to the stolen property. Id. at 261–62.  The MPC drafters, as we 
saw, aimed at eliminating mental elements like “depraved heart” (or “malice aforethought”) 
because they were confusing. See supra Part II.A.  Their replacement—the requirement of 
“intent” for most criminal laws—is the rather thin requirement that the defendant “intended 
his physical acts,” which for Stuntz does insufficient work in delineating between conduct that 
is worthy of criminal punishment and that which is not. STUNTZ, supra, at 260, 262. 
 267. STUNTZ, supra note 266, at 260. 
 268. Two important book reviews written immediately following the publication of The 
Collapse of American Criminal Justice both take Stuntz to task for his observations about the 
MPC’s efforts to reform the concept of culpability.  Robert Weisberg observes:   
[O]ne target of Stuntz’s wrath is the professionalized expert wisdom of the 
academics who created the Model Penal Code (MPC) . . . .  Although the MPC 
purports to disdain strict liability crimes, it enables the creation of proxies for them 
by its hypertechnical, cognitively based definition of mens rea, which drains 
criminal law of its authority to condemn.  There is thus a non sequitur in Stuntz’s 
reading of Morissette, because the evil denounced in Justice Jackson’s opinion—
strict liability—is rejected in Stuntz’s enemy, the MPC.  Requiring knowledge in a 
theft case is hardly inconsistent with the MPC’s use of arguably technical mens rea 
terms. 
Robert Weisberg, Crime and Law:  An American Tragedy, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1425, 1444 
(2012) (citation and footnote omitted).  Here is Stephen J. Schulhofer:   
As part of his skepticism toward elitist reform, Stuntz argues in The Collapse that 
“[t]he law professors who wrote the Model Penal Code helped to replace a system 
of legal doctrine that worked with one that didn’t.” 
 . . .  
  In any case, there can be no doubt about the work of “[t]he law professors who 
wrote the Model Penal Code.”  The Code launched “a frontal attack on absolute or 
strict liability” and replaced loose concepts like “general intent”—often read to 
require no moral blame—with carefully defined mental elements.  It also created a 
robust presumption that we must, if possible, interpret penal statutes to require a 
mental state with clear-cut moral content—at a minimum a “conscious[] disregard[] 
[of] a substantial and unjustified risk [of harm] . . . .  involv[ing] a gross deviation 
from the standard of conduct [of] a law-abiding person.” 
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice, Local Democracy, and Constitutional Rights, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1061–62 (2013) (alteration in original) (citations and footnotes omitted) 
(first quoting Stuntz, supra note 266, at 194; then quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 cmt. 1 
(AM. L. INST. 1985); and then quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c), (3) (AM. L. INST. 
1962)). 
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as a supplement to, not a replacement of, MPC drafting methods.  Thus, a 
proposal in the democratization white paper is that “[a]ll crimes carrying a 
maximum sentence of more than six months should require a showing of 
moral blameworthiness, where ‘moral blameworthiness’ entails, at a 
minimum, disregard for the rights or welfare of others or intent to violate the 
law.”269 
Because of all this, I return to my conclusion that the democratization 
movement is not opposed to modern offense-drafting practices; there is 
nothing that scholars in the movement would find objectionable about 
element analysis or about precise culpability standards working to determine 
liability in conjunction with the new “blameworthiness” element. 
This, then, is why I believe harmful asymmetry is an example of one 
phenomenon in American criminal justice that cuts against claims of the 
democratization movement.  The movement appears to claim, both explicitly 
and through its implicit subsidiarity principle, that local governments will be 
better sources of lay values by which criminal justice can be guided.  But 
local governments, as we have seen, often produce substantive criminal law 
that is drafted more poorly than is state criminal law.270  Expert bureaucrats 
can be credited with the improvements made in the latter, while their absence 
may be blamed for the problems of the former.  And if it is not a lack of 
expertise that results in the condition of local criminal law (incompetence), 
then it may be deliberate broadening.  The lay public, at the smaller 
institutional level where lay influences are most influential, seems to be 
“stupid” or “vengeful”—claims rejected by the democratizers.271  Ironically, 
it may also be that, using the doctrinal tools of mens rea presumptions and 
state-law preemption, expert bureaucrats in the judiciary are best situated to 
ameliorate the problems created by archaic local offenses promulgated 
within a modern code state.272 
 
 269. Kleinfeld et al., supra note 32, at 1698.  This could be incorporated either “as a 
component of mens rea, a separate element of the offense, an affirmative defense, or in some 
other fashion,” so long as it is a jury question. Id. 
 270. See supra Part III.C. 
 271. This claim about “lay leniency” has come under a broader attack.  In an important new 
article, John Rappaport marshals social science data to rebut the argument that the American 
public “hold[s] relatively lenient attitudes toward criminal punishment.” John Rappaport, 
Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 732 (2020); 
id. at 767 (“As it turns out, all three of the national studies suggest the public is at least slightly 
more punitive than the courts.”). 
 272. Consider how this doctrine of mens rea presumption interacts with a harmful 
asymmetry between local and state law.  This doctrine, when it applies, is ameliorative of the 
harm:  it results in a judicial rewriting of an archaic local offense to look more like a modern 
state offense analogue by the grafting on of a mens rea requirement. See, e.g., City of 
Englewood v. Hammes, 671 P.2d 947, 948 & n.1, 952 (Colo. 1983) (interpreting the local 
offense of “interfer[ing] with or hinder[ing] [a police officer] in the discharge of his duty” to 
require mens rea despite the textual absence of a mental element (quoting a city of Englewood 
ordinance)).  Preemption—the doctrine that displaces local laws with state laws—can be 
similarly ameliorative. See, e.g., State v. Crawley, 447 A.2d 565, 570 & n.4 (N.J. 1982) 
(holding that an archaic-type local loitering ordinance punishing “remaining idle in essentially 
one place . . . spending time idly, loafing or walking about aimlessly, [or] . . . ‘hanging 
around’” was field preempted by state law, which required culpability, noting the goal of a 
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C.  Localism Reappraised 
As we come to the end of our analysis of the implications of the 
phenomenon of harmful local-state offense-drafting asymmetry for the 
misdemeanor and democratization literatures, we come full circle and return 
to the dilemma of localism—the joint opportunity and threat presented by 
devolution of power.  Recall the summary of the dilemma given by Roderick 
Hills:  “lovers of local government . . . are going to have to make a tough 
choice between direct political participation that local governments facilitate 
and the social inequality and parochialism that local governments also seem 
to promote.”273  Indeed, the dilemma seems most consequential when the 
local power being exercised is the power to criminalize conduct.  Natapoff 
and the democratizers, though, fall squarely on the prolocalism side. 
Natapoff writes of reform such that “many misdemeanor changes will of 
necessity be bottom-up, driven by local residents, advocates, and public 
officials.”274  This is a cause for hope, though, and not concern:  “The beauty 
of localism, however, is that it offers enormous room for creativity and 
experimentation; each jurisdiction can implement change in its own ways, 
given its own population, history, needs, and resources.”275 In reviewing 
Natapoff’s claims discussing this experimentation approvingly, Judge 
Stephanos Bibas adds that localism also allows for “room for variation” 
between different communities that may have different views about criminal 
justice and “social order.”276  Additionally, recall Rick Bierschbach’s 
conclusion that “[t]he benefits of this [localist] structure . . . rest on broadly 
democratic concepts like representativeness, deliberation, and self-
determination.”277  Similarly, he writes, “[g]reater attention to the values . . . 
 
“comprehensive system of criminal law” in the state (alteration in original) (quoting Newark, 
N.J., REV. ORDINANCES tit. 17, ch. 2, § 14 (1966), repealed by Newark, N.J., Rev. Ordinance 
Repealing in Its Entirety Revised Ordinances of the City of Newark, County of Essex, Title 
XX, Chapter 2, Section 14, Loitering (June 3, 2009)).  The ameliorative effects of the doctrines 
of mens rea presumption and preemption are the product of judicial experts, not lay values. 
 273. Hills Jr., supra note 6, at 2011–12.  For an excellent summary of this debate, to which 
I am indebted, see Barron, supra note 6, at 2330–32. 
 274. NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 226. 
 275. Id. at 226–27 (“In the misdemeanor world, every . . . municipality can launch its own 
experiment.”); see also id. at 245 (“Municipalities can unilaterally improve their practices 
whenever they choose, with immediate effect on the lives of local residents.”); id. (“Seen 
through this lens, the misdemeanor system is a place of hope.”); Bibas, supra note 112, at 
1041 (“Natapoff recognizes the need for localism and in places comes close to embracing it.  
Our country is vast, and our criminal-justice systems are many, fragmented, and varied.  
Though many scholars instinctively distrust localities, Natapoff sees their bottom-up role as 
both inevitable and desirable, letting them try out creative experiments . . . .”). 
 276. Bibas, supra note 112, at 1041 (“Some communities prize orderly public spaces and 
are willing to trade away more liberty.  Others are more relaxed about social disorder and 
disruption.  The genius of American federalism (and localism) is that the police and 
prosecutors in each community can calibrate the level of enforcement to their communities.  
Communities can govern themselves, deliberating on and making their own tradeoffs.  There 
is not a single Platonic ideal, but a range of approaches.  And democracy is not static, but 
adapts these approaches over time to each community’s needs and in light of what it learns 
from experimenting.”). 
 277. Bierschbach, supra note 258, at 1446. 
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[of] localism could . . . help,” and suggests that devolution of legislative 
power could “enhance representativeness.”278  “City councils,” Bierschbach 
argues, “could be given real power to craft their own substantive criminal 
codes in response to community concerns . . . even if far-flung state 
legislators disagree.”279 
Scholars of federalism will recognize a number of familiar arguments in 
the above claims (localist and federalist arguments usually mirror each 
other).280  Natapoff is explicitly invoking the famous vision of smaller 
governmental units as “laboratories of experimentation,”281 while Bibas adds 
an often used argument that devolution enables different lawmaking 
jurisdictions to have their own moral viewpoints instantiated in law.282  The 
thrust of Bierschbach’s localist argument is, like the others, a well-known 
claim that power devolution enhances democratic values (especially political 
participation).283 
The phenomenon of harmful asymmetry should concern proponents of 
localism; it is evidence that in the context of criminal offense drafting, the 
threat posed by localism is greater than the opportunity.284  Perhaps it could 
be true that localities could act as experimental laboratories in the benefits of 
different ways of writing criminal laws; but harmful asymmetry shows that 
without skilled “scientists” to help localities set up and learn from their 
experiments, the laboratory is likely to learn nothing or to harm.  Perhaps it 
is true that different localities should be able to reflect different visions of 
morality in their criminal law; harmful asymmetry, though, shows that this 
allows for localities to deliberately broaden offenses through the widespread 
use of strict liability.  And finally, perhaps it is true that smaller governmental 
 
 278. Id. at 1452. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Since federalism is now “discussed in terms of normative concerns, but federalism’s 
values are not distinctively associated with the states,” the result is that “the case for federalism 
tends to resemble the case for localism.” Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?”:  
Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 
1311–12 (1994). 
 281. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
 282. For elaborations of the experimentation rationale, see, for example, Barry Friedman, 
Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 404–05 (1997); Susan R. Klein, Independent-
Norm Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1541, 1541–42 (2002).  For discussion 
of the value of smaller jurisdictional boundaries in order to allow for concentrated groups of 
people with similar moral viewpoints to create their own law, see Deborah Jones Merritt, The 
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy:  Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 8 (1988) (arguing that federalism allows for the “type of social and political climate 
[citizens] prefer”); see also Friedman, supra, at 401–02 (calling this a “cultural diversity” 
argument). 
 283. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills Jr., The Individual Right to Federalism in the Rehnquist 
Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 888, 889 (2006) (arguing that “federalism itself is an individual 
right because it provides an accessible mechanism by which laypeople can influence the scope 
of their rights”); Merritt, supra note 282, at 7–8 (arguing that political involvement engendered 
by smaller jurisdictions “trains citizens in the techniques of democracy, fosters accountability 
among elected representatives, and enhances voter confidence in the democratic process”). 
 284. Again, this Article does not consider a context in which a locality drafted modern 
offenses in an archaic code state, as such an example has not yet been found. 
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units allow for greater democratic participation in the creation of criminal 
law; but harmful asymmetry suggests that such participation, when 
unmediated by expertise, results in a retrograde form of criminal law. 
CONCLUSION 
More scholarly attention must be paid to the vast body of criminal law that 
local governments create.  This Article has assessed one important dimension 
of this local criminalization:  the form in which localities draft their offenses.  
As illustrated above, offense drafting at this governmental level often 
employs an archaic model, with little concern given to culpability 
requirements or the facilitation of element analysis.  The advances of modern 
drafting are either ignored or deliberately rejected.  This seems to be 
especially problematic when the locality is promulgating offenses in a state 
that has consciously reformed its code in light of the ALI’s 
recommendations—here, home rule creates an asymmetry between local and 
state criminal law and thwarts modernization efforts.  These claims weigh 
against accepting the optimism, stated by many scholars and reformers, that 
increased localism will mitigate problems in the criminal justice system more 
than it will aggravate them. 
 
